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1. Introduction 
Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs)1
The PPP concept differs from other forms of private provision of assets, such as contracting out and 
privatisation, in relation to the dimensions of risks and rewards sharing and greater private involvement in 
the finance arrangements (Hodge, 2005). The relationships within a PPP are established by a concession 
contract that enables a commercial organisation to design, build, finance and operate an asset for an 
agreed period, hence they are known as DBFOs
 are a public procurement policy that argues in support of greater 
value for money through optimal risk-sharing, by aligning incentives among parties who are profoundly 
different in terms of interests, objectives and risk preferences.  
2,3
The subject of interest in this study is PPP tollroads, which traditionally involve the transfer of demand 
risk to the private sector. The focus is on the structure of PPP road concession contracts, which defines the 
risk allocation strategy, impacting on contracting parties’ risk preferences.  
. The principal rationale for PPPs is that they facilitate 
the transfer of risk to the party that has the greatest capacity to manage that risk (Partnerships Victoria, 
2000; HM Treasury, 2006; NSW Treasury, 2012).   
Research Question 1 (RQ1): 
What are the risk preferences of stakeholders engaging in PPP tollroad projects? 
The second area of investigation is to examine how the defined risk preferences would influence 
stakeholders’ choice of contract between PPPs and other alternatives. 
Research Question 2 (RQ2): 
To what extent do stakeholders’ risk preferences influence their choice of procurement 
method? 
In recognising the limitations of contract incompleteness (Grossman and Hart, 1986), we are further 
motivated to investigate determinants of risk preferences and contract choice, at the contract level and 
beyond the contract level. 
Research Question 3 (RQ3):  
How are risk preferences and choice of procurement method affected by factors at contract, 
policy and institutional levels?  
The first question will be explored using discrete choice models to analyse data collected by a computer-
aided-personal-instrument (CAPI) survey. The survey includes a stated-choice (SC) experiment that 
gathers data on international stakeholders’ perceptions of risk associated with alternative packages of 
attributes that define the dimensions of PPP risk, and questions to elicit revealed preference (RP) data on 
the stakeholders’ experience of risk allocation in past tollroad concessions. The candidate attributes 
revealed in the in-depth interview study (Chung et al., 2010) are used in the choice experiment. With the 
derived risk indices that measure stakeholders’ risk preferences, we estimate a number of ordered logit 
models to investigate RQ2. We call on different theoretical constructs in the contracting paradigm, 
namely incomplete contract theory (ICT) and transaction cost economics (TCE) to examine RQ3 and 
suggest ways to better risk-sharing outcomes.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. The first contribution is the quantification of 
stakeholders’ risk preferences through the calculus of a PPP risk index (PPPRI). Many empirical studies 
of contracting assume that the risk preferences of the contracting parties are given (e.g., Allen and Lueck, 
                                                          
1 PPPs are also termed Privately Financed Projects (PFPs) in the NSW Government procurement policy (NSW Treasury, 2006). The early 
generation of the British equivalent is the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). In this study, the terms PPPs and PFPs are interchangeable, while 
PFIs refer specifically to projects undertaken in the UK.  
2 The use of terminology varies between countries. In the UK, a DBFO project in transport involves the transfer of ownership at the end of the 
concession period (Glaister et al., 2000), while the similar arrangement in Australia is termed BOOT (Debande, 2002 p. 380).    
3 There are many different types of PPPs, see for example Broadbent and Laughlin (1999) for a review of different organisational structures of 
PPPs. This study only examined the DBFO type. 
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1999; Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Chen and Chiu, 2010), or use self-reported measures (e.g., Gaynor 
and Gertler, 1995; Jin and Doloi, 2008), which may lead to conclusions that are potentially biased. This 
study empirically derives a set of risk indices to measure the risk preferences of key stakeholders who 
have been actively engaging in PPP tollroads. The derived risk indices have made it possible to draw an 
objective and unbiased conclusion. Although the indices are derived from data that are primarily 
concerned with PPP tollroad concessions, the process of derivation can be readily applied to other areas of 
risk management.   
If risk preferences are correspondent to risk premium charge by the market, our evidence on RQ2 sheds 
light on ways to structure a PPP contract if the principal wishes to drive the premium down. 
A further contribution is the examination of the PPP procurement method through the body of work on 
contracting. Premised on a number of propositions established in the contracting literature, our aim is to 
evaluate how effectively does the contractual approach of PPPs facilitate the realisation of value for 
money (VFM). Through the lens of contract, we are able to gain an insight into the extent to which risk 
allocation that accommodates different preferences for risk can foster interests and goals congruent to the 
realisation of policy objectives. The analytics from the behavioural data at microscope level support the 
position that PPPs can deliver VFM. Using data simulation that creates various combinations of risk 
allocation to vary the levels of the derived risk index of PPPs, we suggest possible ways to improve risk-
sharing outcomes.  
In the next section, we introduce the method of deriving the risk index to guide the collection of behaviour 
data. Section 3 develops a research framework through the lens of contract, and proposes a number of 
testing propositions. In Section 4, we set out the data collection method and provide a descriptive 
overview of the data from the choice experiment and other questions in the overall CAPI survey. The 
descriptive analysis focuses on the contrast between the perceptions of risk of public sector respondents 
versus private sector respondents. The analysis reveals that the underlying motivation of the PPP 
procurement policy is, as argued by pundits, essentially to establish a financing mechanism for 
government road authorities around the world to fulfil their obligations of providing their constituents 
with public road space. This observation holds true at the country level as well as at the global level. 
Section 5 reports the results of hypothesis testing. Section 6 reflects on the limitations of the contracting 
paradigm in analysing risk-sharing behaviour in PPPs, and presents a discussion of the contributions, 
policy implications and limitations of the present research.  
2. Quantitative instrument to measure risk preferences 
We draw on the Hensher Service Quality Index (HSQI) empirical framework (Hensher and Prioni, 2002; 
Hensher et al., 2003) as a way to establish a set of risk indices relevant to PPP roads as measures of 
contracting parties’ risk preferences. The HSQI represents a set of quantitative performance indicators 
used to measure bus service delivery quality and effectiveness. Under this framework, the overall level of 
passenger satisfaction is measured by how an individual evaluates the total package of services offered. 
The evaluation process involves the search for appropriate weights attached to each service dimension in 
order to identify the strength of positive and negative sources of overall satisfaction.  
To fulfil this objective, stated-choice (SC) methods were used in the original study (Hensher and Prioni, 
2002), whereby a sample group of passengers was asked to choose their most preferred package from a 
number of alternative packages of service levels based on their attributes. Logit models were estimated to 
establish the relative weights attached to the statistically significant attributes, representing the 
contribution of each service attribute to the calculation of an overall service quality index. In addition, as 
reference levels must be identified in order to apply the weights, revealed preference (RP) data of the 
perceptions of passengers relative to the levels of each attribute as experienced in a current trip were 
obtained and then multiplied by the relevant weight. Summing these calculations across all attributes 
produced the service quality index for each sampled passenger.  
To implement the HSQI framework, we designed a series of SC experiments to obtain behaviour data on 
respondents’ perception of risk associated with alternative packages of attributes that define the 
dimensions of PPP risk, in order to define a set of quantitative risk attributes pertinent to PPP roads.  
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We follow the existing literature (Monteiro, 2010, p. 263) to define risk as:  
An event that may or may not occur and can lead to failure to satisfy project requirements … 
and is being considered as having an upside and a downside: a party facing risk suffers from 
negative events, but may also benefit from positive events. In this way, the party will have 
higher incentives for putting effort into preventing negative outcomes.  
Risk comprises the expected value of a trade-off outcome associated with downside risk (the likelihood of 
an outcome reaching a disaster level), upside gain (the likelihood of an outcome reaching an optimistic 
level), and risk neutrality (the likelihood of an outcome reaching the expected level) (Lafontaine and 
Bhattacharyya, 1995). In the seminal paper by March and Shapira (1987), risk preference is subject to a 
decision-maker’s ability to control the odds, is conditional upon their experience in the underlying 
investment, their knowledge and skills in pooling resources to mitigate downside outcomes and in trading 
off one risk with another, and their informational advantage. The considerations of trade-off are framed by 
attention factors that considerably affect action. Risk-averse individuals tend to pay greater attention to 
the dangers of downside risk, hence displaying a propensity for risk-avoidance; risk-seeking individuals 
have a predilection for opportunities for upside gain and thus exhibit risk-prone behaviour; and risk-
neutral individuals favour certainty over variability, with a strong reaction to risk neutrality.  
In the experiment design, we adopted the nine key risk attributes pertaining to PPP roads identified in 
Chung et al. (2010). These are: traffic risk, financial risk, network risk, force majeure, sovereign risk, risk 
of unclear project objectives, political and reputation risk, media risk and risk of public perceptions. Each 
risk is further divided into three attribute levels: downside risk, risk neutrality and upside gain. The 
definition of each risk attribute is provided in Appendix A.  
Construction of the empirical risk index entails using parameter estimates obtained from a choice model, 
using data gathered from the SC experiment to condition the role of reference levels representing the 
attribute risk levels perceived by stakeholder experience in real PPP settings. We used the latent class 
model (LCM) to obtain estimates of the parameters. The LCM is preferred over the standard multinomial 
logit model because of the increased behavioural richness of the model in accommodating heterogeneity 
of stakeholder preferences for specific levels of risk (given the likely outcome associated with the full 
attribute package). LCM models also avoid the controversial implications of arbitrarily selecting specific 
continuous distribution for each parameter that is required in mixed (or random parameter) logit models, 
and they are also starting to accumulate evidence of improved goodness-of-fit over all alternative discrete 
choice model forms (Greene and Hensher, 2003). The risk index of interest is given in Equation (1). 
 
(1) 
(PPPRI=risk index; n=decision maker, j=investment alternative, k=attribute weight) 
Given the reported reference levels from respondents’ prior experience in terms of risk borne in PPP road 
projects, i.e.,  in Equation (1), we multiply the  by the betas (parameter estimates) and sum them 
across all risk attributes to produce the risk index as the measure of each respondent’s risk preference. A 
respondent is risk-averse if the outcome of Equation (1) is negative; a respondent is risk-seeking if the 
outcome is positive; and a respondent is risk-neutral if the outcome is zero. 
3. Research framework 
We use the contracting perspective to investigate RQ3. In the contracting literature, two approaches have 
come to dominate the analysis of contracts: incomplete contract theory (ICT) and transaction cost 
economics (TCE). They are distinguished by differences in their underlying assumptions, in their 
emphasis on different motives to contract, and different functions of contract. We develop a number of 
hypotheses under the premises of ICT and TCE to understand the power of contract and factors beyond 
the contract level in determining the degree of risk preferences and stakeholders’ contract choice. 
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3.1 Incomplete contract theory  
ICT points out that in anticipation of large transaction costs involved in writing a comprehensive contract 
and the rigidity of court enforcement of written contract terms, parties to a relationship will prefer to settle 
for a contract that is incomplete (Klein, 1996). Under the conditions of low describability of transactions 
ex ante and uncertainty due to the absence of complete information on future states, the theory focuses on 
incentive designs that induce ex ante investments. Property rights are at the centre of the analysis – they 
empower the owner with a bundle of ex post decision rights: (a) ability to act on uncontracted-for 
provisions and therefore have greater incentive to invest ex ante (Grossman and Hart, 1986); (b) 
protection against ex post expropriation on investments (Laffont and Tirole, 1991); and (c) residual rights 
to insider information (Schmidt, 1996).4
The enhanced incentive that comes with the property rights suggests that the structure of a PPP contract, 
which bundles asset construction and service provision under one ownership, strengthens incentives for 
risk-taking. The literature has demonstrated that in projects where the risk of unclear project objectives 
prevailed, ownership shielded the contractor from this risk, as it  resulted from poorly defined objectives 
by the responsible government authority (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005).  
 The behavioural assumptions regard contracting parties as 
rational without constraint, whereas the rationality of an outside arbiter (the judge) is irremediably 
bounded – a premise that necessitates the relevance of ex ante asset ownership (Hart, 1990). Credible 
commitments, reputation and trustworthiness of contracting parties play little role in ICT because of the 
judicial imperfection that believes that contract variables are observable but not verifiable (Hart, 2002).  
On the basis of this literature, we predict that private sector agents are risk-averse5
H1a 
 to unclear project 
objectives (H1a). Because ownership empowers the agent with the freedom of adopting measures to 
manage uncontracted-for events, we argue that the PPP contract with the embedded ownership entitlement 
would be preferred by the agent over other alternatives (H1b). From the principal’s standpoint, the 
enhanced value of clearly defined project objectives, as highlighted in Bajari and Tadelis (2001), 
reinforces the benefit of cost savings to the public sector procurer carried through from the ex ante 
competitive tendering, which leads us to predict that public sector authorities are averse to unclear project 
objectives (H1c).  
Unclear project objectives will increase private sector agents’ risk 
aversion. 
H1b The higher the risk of unclear project objectives, the more preferred is the 
PPP method by private sector agents. 
H1c Unclear project objectives will increase public sector authorities’ risk 
aversion. 
Property rights are supposed to entitle the proprietor to the freedom of making decisions on how much 
they charge users for using their asset. PPP tollroads, however, often preclude this privilege as toll pricing 
is politically sensitive, and therefore heavily regulated. ICT would argue that both the agent and the 
principal should be in favour of the relaxation of this condition, because such freedom would incentivise 
the agent to exert more performance effort from which the principal would equally benefit. 
H2a:  Private sector agents are in favour of the option of having the freedom to set toll 
pricing, i.e., the freedom will reduce private sector agents’ risk aversion.   
H2b: Public sector authorities are in favour of the option of granting the private sector 
agents the freedom to set toll pricing, i.e., the granting of the right will reduce 
public sector authorities’ risk aversion. 
                                                          
4 Laffont and Tirole (1991) magnify the trade-off between efficiency and asset expropriation when the regulated firm has an information 
advantage. Its extended model (Schmidt, 1996) considers regulation with asymmetric information. Both models are integral to the theory of 
property rights and incomplete contracts. The analysis on PPPs however, is most extensively based on Laffont and Tirole’s proposition, which 
features symmetric information with contract incompleteness and uncertainty.  
5 Following agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), we assume agents are risk-averse. We will confirm this after deriving the PPPRI in a 
later section. 
Contractual approach to optimising risk sharing:  A quantitative study of the multidimensional nature of risk 
in private provision of road infrastructure. 
Chung, Hensher and Rose 
 
5 
 
We have argued in Chung et al. (2010) that governments were often seen to use private ownership to 
shield themselves from risks related to politically sensitive matters, such as direct exposure to conflicts 
arising from the workforce. Theoretically, the concessionaire would be able to exercise full flexibility, as 
if they were the owner, to deal with labour productivity issues (H3a). The perception however, would 
have the adverse effect on the principal, as it would mar the public acceptance of any PPP project and the 
public image of government (H3b).  
H3a: The public perception that ownership transfer is seen to transfer ownership-related 
risk arising from workforce dispute will increase the risk aversion of private sector 
agents. 
H3b: The public perception that ownership transfer is seen to transfer ownership-related 
risk arising from workforce dispute will increase the risk aversion of public sector 
authorities. 
3.2 Transaction cost economics  
While ICT emphasis is on ex ante incentive alignment and distribution of residual surplus through the 
allocation of decision rights, TCE seeks to craft ex post governance structures to align with the differential 
attributes of transactions (Williamson, 1979). TCE explains why exchange partners value reputational 
effects, multilateral dependence, mutual credible commitments and self-enforcing agreements. 
Three governance structures exist within the TCE regime: the two polar opposites – markets and 
hierarchies (firms), and an intermediate hybrid mode (contracts). Each is described in terms of different 
levels of governance attributes, i.e., incentive intensity, administrative control and contract laws regime 
(Williamson, 2006). The hybrid mode, which includes various forms of long-term contracting of high 
levels of asset specificity (Williamson, 1985; 1991), fosters autonomous and cooperative adaptations; 
risk-sharing is a central motivation to organise transactions under this form (Ménard, 2004).  
The effectiveness of governance mechanisms largely relies on the institutional environment within which 
transactions are organised. Williamson proposed the shift parameter framework, where the institutional 
environment is treated as a set of parameters, “… changes in which elicit shifts in the comparative cost of 
governance” (1991, p. 287), which may change the optimal governance form for a given set of 
transactions.    
Within the PPP framework there are different procurement methods (Soliño and Gago de Santos, 2010) 
that are characterised by the surrounding institutional environment. These observations are in line with 
Williamson’s shift parameter framework (Williamson, 1991), which suggest that institutional factors can 
influence the choice of PPP methods.  
H4:  Institutional factors will significantly influence the choice of procurement methods 
by all parties, i.e., PPPs versus other methods. 
Due to its long duration, a PPP contract is inevitably confronted by many uncertainties. For example: 
demand uncertainty, such as the use of the facility by private vehicles, generates financial concern for the 
private operator; technology uncertainty, which includes tolling technology, generates operational 
difficulty for the operator and creates network integration problems for the road authority6
If we make allowances for variable risk preferences existing in the TCE framework
; and 
uncertainty of the institutional environment will have a fundamental influence on the choice of method of 
organising transactions for all parties involved (Oxley, 1999).  
7
 
 as proposed by 
Chiles and McMackin (1996), we argue that the greater the uncertainty an economic actor confronts, the 
more risk-averse they become. Uncertainty can be minimised, and risk aversion can be reduced by 
transacting in a stable institutional environment and by clearly articulating contractual conditions.  
                                                          
6 The integrated electronic tolling for Melbourne CityLink encountered serious technical problems that caused a lengthy delay in its opening. 
7 Williamson maintains the behavioural assumption of risk neutrality to place emphasis on governance structures, which may go unnoticed 
when the risk preferences of transactors are made the focus of attention (Williamson, 1985, p. 388-390). 
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H5a:  Contractual conditions and institutional variables will significantly affect the risk 
preferences of contracting parties. 
If sovereign risk measures the stability of the transaction environment, it is expected that private sector 
agents’ risk aversion is positively associated with sovereign risk: 
H5b:  Sovereign risk will significantly increase the risk aversion of private sector agents. 
The characteristic of asset specificity associated with PPP transactions, i.e., there is a near nil possibility 
of relocating a transport infrastructure other than designated in the contract, exposes governments to lock-
in and hold-up situations. Lock-ins occur where the obligation of being responsible for significant 
financial compensation to the concessionaire once the asset is built may deter the public sector procurer 
from seeking service supply elsewhere (Williamson, 1979, p. 251). Hold-ups occur when unanticipated 
events place the contractual relationship outside the self-enforcing range (Klein, 1996). In hold-up 
situations, governments are exposed to deceptive acts by the concessionaire, who may withhold crucial 
inputs or pose threats to terminate the contract in order to obtain benefits that governments hoped to 
derive from the investment. Mitigations to problems of this kind include self-enforcing safeguards, such 
as credible commitment, reputation and trust; these traits have yielded lower transaction costs over an 
indefinite time horizon compared with repeated short-term legal contracts (Dyer, 1997).  
If economising transaction cost over the long-term is an important consideration to market participants, 
we expect:   
H6:  Private sector agents who are actively engaging in PPP contracts value their 
reputation effect. 
In an extended model of TCE, Chiles and McMackin (1996) predict that interdependence exists between 
the choice of governance structure and risk preferences of transactors with respect to the underlying 
transaction. Their prediction implies that risk preferences are contextually dependent on the structure of 
contract. The flow-on implication on a risk-sharing contract is that: 
H7:  Risk preferences are significantly affected by how risks are shared. 
3.3 Summary 
The foregoing discussion on the contracting literature has shown that each of the two strands offers a 
unique insight into contracting problems, while sharing complementary perspectives. Beyond the common 
ground on behavioural attributes of economic actors, each strand formulates its theoretical constructs 
based on its respective unit of analysis. ICT establishes a number of propositions to account for attributes 
related to incomplete contract; its unit of analysis is contract. TCE introduces asset specificity and extends 
the factors of investigation to institutional variables; its unit of analysis is transaction. The two strands are 
interconnected by the added attributes: ICT explores the likelihood of risk-sharing outcomes through the 
assignment of residual rights; and TCE searches for the optimal governance structure suitable for the 
dimensions of the underlying transaction. In the survey design, we will formulate a number of questions 
to seek stakeholders’ views on the factors identified in this section; these factors will then be tested 
against the PPPRI and stakeholders’ choice of contract in order to answer RQ3.  
4. Survey design and data description 
We designed a computer-assisted personal-instrument (CAPI) survey as the data collection instrument. 
The CAPI includes a SC experiment with five hypothetical scenarios, and a number of additional screens 
that seek information on the respondent’s experience with PPPs as well as their subjective views on the 
key drivers of risk. There are several distinct parts to the survey: (1) general questions capturing the socio-
demographic covariates of respondents and other contextual effects; (2) choice menus corresponding to a 
PPP tollroad concession setting; (3) questions related to the attribute processing strategies (APSs) enacted 
by respondents within each choice situation; (4) RP questions surveying respondents’ prior experience to 
determine the reference level for the derivation of the risk index; (5) attitudinal questions intended to 
obtain respondents’ opinions of the adequacy of risk allocation in PPP tollroad projects and their 
preference for the PPP procurement method; and (6) questions intended to evaluate the extent to which 
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other institutional and contractual conditions impact on respondents’ decisions to enter into a PPP 
contract.  
In the following sections, we will describe in detail the design as well as analyse the empirical data 
collected for each part. 
Part 1: Socio-demographic covariates of respondents and other contextual effects 
The design  
This is the first of the six sections of the CAPI survey. We solicited respondents from the mailing list of 
the Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies at the University of Sydney based on the criteria that they 
must have had direct input in the decision-making process of entering into a PPP road contract. Additional 
subjects were recruited through referrals by respondents.  
After the pilot study with eight respondents, it was clear that the conciseness of the experiment required a 
detailed explanation to ensure a consistent understanding of the experiment across all respondents. 
Therefore, a decision was made to adopt the CAPI approach to complete the collection process. Semi-
structured interviews were set up for the subsequent 93 respondents. Interviews lasted on average 100 
minutes. Most meetings were face-to-face, some were through Skype, and two were by telephone; all 
were undertaken by the first author.  
At the beginning of the survey, respondents were invited to give an account of their background and 
experience in the field. These accounts were recorded on tape (with permission) to provide a means of 
assurance to cross-reference the information provided in the survey. These 10-15 minute initial 
conversations benefit the research in a number of ways: (a) they help make sense of the perspectives of 
the respondents, and the information is then reflected in the first screen of the survey – About You and the 
Projects You Have Been Involved In (Figure 1); (b) the information unveiled in the conversation 
determined the role the respondents would play in the experiments; and (c) they provided points for cross-
referencing with survey data when information was missing or unclear.   
Data descriptions 
One hundred and one people participated in the survey, of whom 41 represented the public sector and 60 
the private sector. A list of respondents is included in Appendix B. The international significance of this 
study is enhanced by the coverage and diversity of the experience and knowledge of respondents who 
took part in the survey. Their experience in PPP years (projects) ranged from 1 to 46 years (1 to 120 
projects), and brought to this study project experience in 6 geographic regions covering 32 countries. The 
diversity of their backgrounds has strengthened the study’s global significance: there are 24 different roles 
represented, from primary decision maker to consultant, from 14 different organisations, including 
steering committees and commercial banks.  
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Figure 1:  Details of respondents and projects of involvement 
 
The distributions in Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that the participating cohort represents a good spread 
across roles and organisations.  
 
 
Figure 2:  Distribution of roles - 101 respondents 
 
Figure 3:  Distribution of organisations - 101 respondents  
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Public sector respondents  
Among the 41 public sector respondents (PUBLIC), 68 per cent worked in public road authorities with a 
sizeable proportion has a regulator background (39 per cent). Two PUBLIC indicated they were acting as 
debt financier – public authorities in some countries (like Spain) and some international organisations 
(like the European Bank and Asian Development Bank) would lend to tollroad companies at a lower-than-
market interest rate in order to facilitate project delivery.  
Often, governments create steering committees to oversee a major project. These committees appoint 
auditors and evaluators to assure procurement procedures are adhered to. Before being submitted to the 
Budget Cabinet Committee (or equivalent) for final approval, such governance assurance requires PPP 
contracts to be audited by a party that is independent from all contractual parties.  
Other roles of PUBLIC include internal financial adviser of a road authority, policy adviser of a 
government PPPs unit, PPP liaison officer responsible for exchanging knowledge between European 
countries, commercial lawyers acting on behalf of the public sector procurer, financial adviser to 
government and technical adviser to government.  
Private sector respondents  
Among the 60 private sector respondents (PRIVATE), 93 per cent have first-hand knowledge in bidding 
for PPP tollroads. A large proportion of the construction companies and almost half the investment banks 
occupy multiple roles (e.g., primary decision maker, equity investor, tollroad company). Investment banks 
are also active in assuming financial responsibilities – 18 per cent take on the roles of debt financier and 
underwriter (Figure 4). 
Construction companies and investment banks have cumulative expertise in building infrastructure 
projects, financial power to shoulder the expensive bidding costs, and the financial strength to sustain 
these mega investments. Most bidding consortia are led by one of these two players (or both).8
If successful, they will subsequently incorporate into a tollroad company (the special purpose vehicle or 
the SPV) to manage the construction, as well as operate and maintain the facility. They will also have a 
good proportion of equity stake in the project in order to entice financial interest from the market. Most 
debt financiers, in particular in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC), require the sponsor to 
bear a considerable share of equity risk.  
  
                                                          
8 Different arms of the same construction group will form different consortium to partner with other interested parties to bid for a project. This 
strategy will increase the group’s chance of winning.   
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Figure 4:  Stake in PPP tollroads - construction company vs. investment bank 
In PPP road projects, bidding costs for any private proponent can be well over three per cent of the 
project’s capital value (Dudkin and Välilä, 2005). Theses transaction costs constitute an obvious hurdle 
for new entrants, with the potential impact of undermining the disciplining power of ex ante competition. 
Evidence from the UK suggests that prohibitive transaction costs do indeed deter competition (NAO, 
2007). 
A number of respondents complained that high transaction costs result in PPP roads being predominantly 
the market for construction companies and investment banks9
Ra: High cost of bidding for PPP projects makes it untenable for new players to enter the 
market. 
:  
Some respondents argued that costs were inflated by governments’ procurement processes: 
Rb: Tendering costs are too expensive... financial close documentations are far too rigid. 
Rc: Governments will need to be open to processes that reduce upfront bid costs (and 
associated agency costs on the bidding consortia) and progress to a negotiated style 
of outcome as has been seen in the US. This can be done effectively to achieve the 
same commercial, political and financial outcomes for all parties but will reduce the 
upfront bidding costs. Reducing the upfront bidding costs will also attract offshore 
D&C [design and construction] contractors and other investors who see the bid costs 
as a real barrier to entering the [country’s] market.  
Rd:  Project implementation must consider streamlining procurement processes to reduce 
time and cost for all parties. 
There are many success stories of PPP tollroads being built and operated by construction company-led 
consortia. However, Australia has recently seen a number of high profile projects experiencing severe 
financial difficulties. These failures are considered inevitable by several respondents, for the reason of the 
short-term approach taken by some of these consortia: 
Re: PPPs procured with consortia dominated by [construction companies] (most of those 
procured in the past) can suffer from a short-term perspective. 
Rf: Constructors and short-term financial sponsors have too much influence over long-
term contractual matters to the detriment of the project’s viability.  
Rg:  [The resultant] PPPs create a tension between the need to create a winning bid 
scenario and the most likely ongoing operating conditions.  
                                                          
9 The quotations are provided by respondents in the comment section of the survey. 
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Other roles and organisations of PRIVATE include financial adviser, legal adviser, general counsel of a 
tollroad company, bond issuer of an investment bank, investment fund manager (acting mainly as equity 
sponsor), operations and maintenance contractor, engineering adviser and commercial bank (acting 
mainly as debt financier). 
Some respondents had been independent directors of investment banks, where their role was to exert 
prudential governance to ensure the bank did not undertake aggressive investment decisions. The 
effectiveness of this governance measure was weakened at the time when there was an abundant supply of 
private capital, as noted by one respondent: 
Rh: In the recent projects, the private sector mispriced the risks therefore resulting huge 
losses to them. The aggressive bidding process by the private consortium was driven 
by the desire to win a small number of projects offered to the market in an 
environment where there was over-supply of private capital.   
Comparison of experience: PUBLIC versus PRIVATE 
Compared to PUBLIC, PRIVATE seem to be much more experienced in dealing with PPP projects 
(Figure 5). On average, project experience in any PPP is 30 per cent (20 vs. 14) higher for PRIVATE, 
with project experience specific to PPP tollroads double (50 per cent) for PRIVATE (12 vs. 6). However, 
this should not be interpreted as the private sector being better at the bargaining table, because the 
difference in number of years of experience is marginal (PRIVATE are only 15 per cent, i.e., 13 vs. 11, 
more experienced in any type of PPP and 18 per cent, i.e., 11 vs. 9, more experienced in PPP tollroads).  
 
 
Figure 5:  Overall experience in PPPs – PUBLIC vs. PRIVATE 
Involvement in tollroad projects  
Respondents were asked to list the three most recent projects they had been involved in: 83 listed three, 
while 18 had experience in two or fewer projects. Of these 18 respondents, nine had experience in one 
project; these are summarised in Table 1.  
As shown in Table 1, the locations of projects are diverse, covering six geographic regions and 32 
countries. This shows that the PPP is an important and popular procurement method of road infrastructure 
across the world. Nevertheless, a couple of respondents qualified this finding in light of experience 
encountered in developing economies: 
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Ri: For developing countries, PPPs are difficult to procure, [their] under-developed legal 
framework [presents] higher risk. 
 
Rj:  In developing economies they [PPPs] provide facility for a government to implement 
infrastructure projects which they might not otherwise be able to afford - through 
increased participation of private sector investment. However ability to pay in these 
instances is problematic and government subsidy may be required.  
These comments support our propositions established in Section 5: i) sovereign risk is a concern to the 
private sector, and this is particularly so in developing countries; and ii) PPPs are in essence a financing 
instrument.  
Table 1:  Experience with tollroad projects (regions and countries) 
REGION COUNTRY REGION COUNTRY 
Africa (2 countries)  South Africa Caribbean (2 countries) Jamaica 
Mozambique  Puerto Rico 
Asia-Pacific (9 countries)  
  
Australia Europe (13 countries)  Austria 
Bangladesh  Belgium 
India  Croatia 
Indonesia  France  
Korea  Greece 
New Zealand  Hungry 
Russia  Ireland 
Thailand   Italy 
Vietnam  Netherlands 
North America (3 countries) Canada Poland 
 Mexico Portugal 
 USA Spain 
South America (3 countries) Chile UK 
Brazil  
Colombia Total  32 
 
Eight types of PPP tollroads are identified by all respondents (Figure 6). Motorways top the list (40.22 per 
cent), followed by tunnel (29.71 per cent), and multiple (18.84 per cent)10
Figure 7
 . The nature of project 
experience is divided into four categories ( ): new infrastructure (63.77 per cent), existing 
infrastructure (32.61 per cent)11, other (2.17 per cent)12
                                                          
10 This group includes motorway, tunnel and bridge. 
, and missing link (1.45 per cent). The spike in new 
infrastructure confirms that a large share of roads would not have been available for motorists if private 
finance were not sought.  
11 Includes upgrade, widening, extension, refinancing and acquisition of an existing infrastructure.  
12 Includes upgrading a segment of existing infrastructure plus adding a portion of new infrastructure.  
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Figure 6:  Involvement in Types of PPP Tollroads Figure 7:  Involvement in the nature of PPP tollroads 
Figure 8 illustrates the tolling schemes that respondents have been involved in. A little less than half of 
project experience (46.38 per cent) applies to fixed tolls, among which are three in South Africa that 
charge a fixed toll with a discounting regime; one in Australia and another in South Korea that both are 
paid by a fixed toll and revenue guarantee; one in Canada that is charged to natural gas companies only; 
and one in Belgium where the pricing level change is subject to return on private capital. This is followed 
by 23.91 per cent of project experience charging distance-based tolls, 9.06 per cent charging an 
availability payment, and 8.70 per cent charging distance plus time-based variable tolls, these projects 
being located in Canada and Russia.  
 
 
Figure 8:  Involvement in tolling schemes 
Only one project (located in the US) applies the HOT (mentioned by five respondents). The ‘No new 
tolls’ category accounts for two refinancing projects. The ‘Other’ category includes two projects in 
Canada that charge an availability payment plus a fixed toll; one in Hungary that started with a distance-
based variable toll but changed to an availability payment in 2003; one in Canada that uses an availability 
payment plus 16 per cent of shadow tolls; and one in the US that applies a distance-based variable toll as 
well as a fixed toll. Only three projects apply shadow tolls, one each in Canada, Portugal13
                                                          
13 Portugal is one of the pioneers that embarked on a shadow tollroad program on an aggressive scale; it proved unsustainable as the 
government found the program difficult to budget for and unaffordable, and it was unable to pay for the usage of these roads.  
 and Spain, 
accounting for 1.09 per cent of total project experience. The combination of shadow and availability 
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payment regimes (2.54 per cent) is only seen in the UK. Time-based variable toll represents 2.54 per cent 
of total project experience, over half of which (57 per cent) are in Spain. 
It appears that toll price is primarily used to pay for the project rather than being implemented as a traffic 
demand management device. This observation highlights the potential failure of PPPs to fully exploit the 
market for the purpose of allocative efficiency in managing road space. However, this is not the failure of 
the PPP scheme per se, but rather the outcome of political intent to bypass fiscal constraint.  
A retired director of a road authority succinctly pinpointed the problem:  
Rk:  To get the best outcome for the community each party should bear the risk that is in 
their position to do so. Unfortunately this is not happening in reality. Financing cost, 
tolls, and length of the concession are more than they should be. These were set in the 
view of not adding public debt.  
He was joined by other respondents: 
Rl:  Design, Build, Operate & Maintain [method] brings all the benefits of a PPP without 
having major transaction costs + high risk profile - the only major benefit [of PPPs] 
is having finance that State Governments do not want to borrow or go into debt.  
 
Rm:  [PPP] is a function of western democracies needing to use stretched balance sheets to 
provide services that cannot be funded by the private sector e.g., police, hospital and 
health services and school services.  
Rn:  Currently, due to restrictions in public budget, one could tend to overestimate the 
benefits of PPP. 
Some respondents commented further on the myopic view of politics that may have compromised the 
social benefits of PPPs: 
Ro:  30-year concession period leads to big efficiency savings, [as long as it can] avoid 
political interference (e.g., refusing to increase tolls). 
Rp:  There should however be opportunities [in contracts] for using pricing mechanisms to 
manage the network (i.e. tolls not linked to CPI). 
Most PUBLIC who acted in the capacity of regulator admitted that toll pricing is a sensitive matter and 
therefore its level and escalation clause must be closely regulated. The contract for the first PPP tollroad 
in Toronto, Canada (Motorway 407) did not provide for the regulation of toll escalation. Within their legal 
rights, the private operator increased the toll price a number of times. The price hikes were seen as 
maximising private profit at the expense of the public purse. The high volume of traffic on Motorway 407 
created mounting pressure on government because it meant a bad deal for public users. The government 
later attempted to stop the toll escalation, but lost the law suit to the private operator. Cognisant of the 
407’s poor publicity, some PUBLIC, especially those in Canada, have shown a high level of averseness to 
projects that would yield financial gains to the private operator.  
Many governments impose strong clauses in contracts to limit the private operator’s capacity to set and 
vary toll prices. Figure 9 shows that only 13 per cent of project experience to some extent applies the 
pricing structure (e.g., time variable, HOT) that is linked to traffic demand management, compared to an 
87 per cent share of other tolling schemes.  
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Figure 9:  Tolling scheme – traffic management vs. others 
 
The lack of consistency in tolling schemes has caused unintended consequences for society and for 
infrastructure planning, as one of the PUBLIC commented:  
Rq: In [some jurisdictions] the piecemeal process of tollroad development has led to 
unintended consequences for road users where there is inequality in the cost of [using] 
roads. The benefit of the tollroad methodology coupled with user demand management 
could deliver the funding capability to significantly enhance [the city’s] public and 
private transport requirements. 
 
The power of pricing mechanisms is often overlooked (strategically in some cases). Consequences of toll 
pricing regulation are only narrowly considered at the project level. One respondent noted: 
Rr:  Spain recently in 2007 passed a legislation that the annual escalation of toll prices 
can only be up to 85 per cent of the inflation index. Because the government believed 
that the life-cycle benefit of operating the tollroad should be incorporated in the 
reduced toll price. I think this is a controversial issue. 
Among the countries that embrace time-related variable tolling, Canada and Spain each account for 33.33 
per cent; followed by France, Mexico, Russia and the US, each accounting for 8.33 per cent (Figure 10). 
A few governments are fond of the idea of using a tolling structure to manage roads, albeit not for the 
same purpose. Some government officials candidly maintained that the tolling scheme should be aligned 
with the project objective. A tolling scheme can help remove budget uncertainty. Greenfield projects 
where traffic demand is unknown should be funded by an availability fee, whereas brownfield projects 
where there is an established traffic pattern can be paid by shadow tolls. Different tolling schemes should 
be applied to roads that make up the integrated transport network: a real toll is charged on segments where 
government wants to ensure a smooth flow of traffic, while shadow and availability tolls are used on 
segments where patronage should be encouraged.  
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Figure 10:  Countries using toll pricing for traffic demand management 
The Dutch government is exploring the financial advantage of PPPs while maintaining an independent 
tolling scheme to manage driving behaviour; as described by one of the road authority officials: 
Rs:  PPP is now promoted by the government, but without the private tolling part. We will 
pay the concessionaires on availability of the road. A national electronic tolling 
system is expected in about 2014 on all roads both public and private: the revenues 
will be for the public sector ([to manage] demand). There is no direct link between the 
tolls and revenues to the private operator. The so tolled revenues will go to the 
treasury therefore reduce tax on new vehicles and vehicle ownership. [This is] a new 
way to manage traffic demand, by implementing time-based variable tolls and making 
more expensive to drive a vehicle than owning a vehicle. 
Summary 
The experience of the respondents presents a fair picture of the current state of PPP tollroads around the 
world. It highlights a number of current practices, such as the players in a bidding consortium, the 
institutional environment underlying the PPP transaction (developed versus developing countries), 
restrictions imposed in the contract regarding toll pricing, and the application of the availability payment 
model, to name just a few.  
We will draw on this experience to make sense of our hypothesis testing in Section 5. 
Part 2: The stated choice experiment 
The design 
The SC experiment contains a number of decision choices based on hypothetical scenarios, in which a 
sample of individuals evaluates two unlabelled alternative contracts. An unlabelled contract is one 
described by a bundle of attributes with no label or brand name to characterise what the alternative might 
be. In contrast, a labelled experiment has a specific name attached to each of the alternatives. For 
example, in the Instructions screen in Figure 11, a labelled experiment will have Sydney Harbour Tunnel 
instead of Contract A, and Melbourne CityLink instead of Contract B.  
Contractual approach to optimising risk sharing:  A quantitative study of the multidimensional nature of risk 
in private provision of road infrastructure. 
Chung, Hensher and Rose 
 
17 
 
 
Figure 11:  Stated choice experiment – instructions screen 
The decision to use an unlabelled experiment rather than a labelled one has multiple advantages. First, 
since this is an international study, an unlabelled experiment does not require the identification and use of 
all PPP tollroads in the world, representing significant savings in data collection cost and time. Second 
and more importantly, because a project’s name acts somewhat like an alternative in a labelled 
experiment, this may invite unintended perceptions that respondents might hold with regard to that 
alternative to enter into their decision process, as well as induce the possibility that they will make 
inferences about attributes that are outside the focus of the study (i.e., that are not shown in the 
experiment). This may include assumptions based either on direct experience or second-hand information 
as proxies for these additional attributes (Hensher et al., 2005a, pp. 112-114).  
Each contract (A or B) represents packages of attributes that are defined by levels of risk, and respondents 
are asked to indicate which package they believe would be preferred by the public sector and the private 
consortia. The risk attributes are anchored to current experience described in Chung et al. (2010), so that 
respondents can understand and relate to the attributes in a realistic way. In our design, three attributes 
were selected for each risk; downside risk (where the actual outcome of the risk is inferior to expectations 
at the contract’s financial close), risk neutrality (where the actual outcome of the risk more or less meets 
expectations at the contract’s financial close), and upside gain (where the actual outcome of the risk is 
superior to expectations at the contract’s financial close). Attribute levels were presented in percentage 
terms to represent the degree of (un)certainty of a future eventuality (the three percentages sum to 100 for 
each risk). Choice situations were assigned by a block column so that no contract would be presented 
more than once to the same respondent. The attributes of risk (i.e., downside, neutral, upside) that are 
presented in columns are randomly rotated in order to minimise left-hand-side bias.   
Descriptive data of contract choice 
With background information collected from Part 1, we were able to understand each respondent’s most 
recent experience or the area that they were most experienced in. Before commencing the experiment, 
respondents were briefed that they were going to assess five choice situations based only on hypothetical 
scenarios that had been designed to mimic the risk profile of PPP tollroad contracts. Each respondent was 
specifically instructed to exercise their judgement based upon their prior experience and their ability to 
manage the risks associated with the alternatives. Stated differently, the project risks are presented as the 
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level of downside, upside and neutrality in the experiment; whether they are acceptable to the decision 
maker is dependent on the attitude the decision maker formed from their prior experience with respect to 
their ability to manage and (or) trade-off these project risks, taking into account cooperative efforts of all 
those contracting.  
In each of the five choice situations, respondents were asked to consider contract A and contract B and, 
based on each contract’s risk profile, indicate which contract they thought a private consortia would prefer 
(‘1st row’ in Figure 12) and the contract they believe a public agency would prefer (‘2nd row’ in Figure 
12). In more than half (57 per cent or 290 cases) of the 505 choice situations, respondents believed that 
both parties would prefer the same contract. Of these, a vast majority of 57 per cent (165 cases) of 
respondents are PRIVATE. It suggests that PRIVATE are more confident about reaching an agreement 
with the road authority. Such confidence may have accumulated from their exposure to more projects and 
a greater number of countries.  
In Figure 12, PRIVATE’s choice in the ‘1st row’ and PUBLIC’s choice in the ‘2nd row’ are used to 
obtain parameter estimates (beta in Equation 1) under the LCM model form for each attribute for the 
PRIVATE and PUBLIC respectively.   
After choosing their preferred contract, respondents were asked whether they would accept that contract if 
it actually existed (‘3rd row’ in Figure 12). In 54 per cent of 505 cases, respondents indicated they would 
accept the preferred contract; 60 per cent of respondents came from the private sector. It is evident that 
most PUBLIC favour inaction over action. This status quo bias implies that when making decisions about 
whether or not to enter into a procurement contract, PUBLIC are highly loss-averse, preferring avoidance 
of risks (Kahneman et al., 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). This may be due to the pressures of 
accountability, which increase the status quo bias and other manifestations of loss aversion (Tetlock and 
Boettger, 1994).  
 
 
Figure 12:  The stated choice experiment – contract choice 
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Figure 1314
In terms of respondents’ appetite for tollroads, consultants – who have the highest incidence of accepting 
the preferred contract if it existed – are the most aggressive in their investment decisions. This is within 
expectations given that consultants do not bear any project risks. One consultant informed the first author 
that they were typically paid a set fee by the bidding consortium regardless of the outcome of the bid, or a 
percentage of the project cost if the consortium won the project. The latter may have fuelled a strong 
desire to take aggressive measures, including optimism bias in traffic forecasts (GHD, 2011).  
 shows that consultants would most likely accept the preferred contract if it existed, closely 
followed by stakeholders from tollroad companies. Interest in tollroads from construction companies 
remains strong, while interest from pension funds has overtaken that of investment banks. Investment 
banks are the least likely to accept the preferred contract, even though in the past they had a highly active 
role in the field. This dramatic change in appetite toward tollroads may be related to the failure of a 
number of high-profile tollroads worldwide. Each of these failed projects involved a large proportion of 
stake from investment banks. One such experience has resulted in the restructure of an Australian-based 
international tollroad company that was backed by an investment bank. Subsequently, the new entity now 
only manages the existing tollroad assets, and no longer engages in acquiring new tollroads.  
 
Figure 13:  Would accept the contract if it existed – PRIVATE 
Construction companies and pension fund managers are slightly behind consultants in their respective 
incidence of accepting the preferred contract if it existed. Winning a project will generate construction 
revenues for constructors, many of whom do not tend to hold the asset for the long term; therefore, 
tollroads are fairly safe investments for these players. This observation leads us to expect that the leader 
of the bidding consortium may be less risk-averse compared with the other members of the consortium 
bid team. We will test this in the empirical section. Pension funds prefer PPPs because these projects have 
a maturity similar to the fund’s liabilities; moreover, PPP projects are the only component of public 
infrastructure that offer asset ownership to private capital.  
In Table 2, the average extent to which individual respondents consider that the other party in the scheme 
would accept the contract that they prefer (‘4th row’ in Figure 12) is shown to be 55.28 per cent. The 
average of PUBLIC (55.50 per cent) is very close to that of the PRIVATE (55.13 per cent). However, 
PRIVATE (66.67 per cent) are more likely to believe that the public sector party would definitely accept 
the contract they prefer. That shows that the PRIVATE are more optimistic in terms of reaching a deal 
with public authorities. Interview data confirm that many PRIVATE consider that they are willing to take 
on any risks as long as they will be adequately compensated for. This information reaffirms the positive 
relationship between risk preferences and risk premium.  
                                                          
14 Multiplications of roles and organisations have been removed from the numbers reported in Figure 13. Each category has been examined 
carefully by cross-referencing to notes taken during the survey and conversations recorded, to determine the primary role/organisation of the 
respondent for the survey purpose.   
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If risk preferences are indeed contextually dependent, as predicted by TCE and March and Shapira (1987), 
our investigations of avenues in which one’s risk preference can be modified – and hence the 
correspondent level of risk premium – will offer new means by which PPPs can enhance VFM.  
Part 3: Attribute processing strategies of respondents 
The design 
Decision-making processes are sensitive to the complexity of the decision-making context (Simon, 1986). 
With 54 cells in a single-choice situation (two contracts by nine risks by three attributes), we suspected 
that respondents would not consider all risk attribute levels when choosing the preferred contract.  
When confronted with complexity, individuals will adopt decision-making strategies to simplify the 
process, including focusing on a limited number of attributes that are of paramount importance to them. In 
some cases, individuals were found to ignore specific attributes as a coping strategy to process 
information in order to deal with the perceived complexity of a SC experiment (Hensher et al., 2005b). In 
other scenarios, individuals were observed to ignore unimportant attributes as part of their appraisal of the 
relevance of the information available (Hensher, 2004; Hensher, 2006).   
Table 2:  Extent that the other party would accept the contract I prefer 
 ALL 
% 
PUBLIC 
% 
% of choosing 
min/max 
PRIVATE 
% 
% of choosing 
min/max 
Average  55.28 55.50   55.13   
Median 60.00 60.00   52.50   
Mode 50.00 50.00   50.00   
Std. Deviation 26.34 26.01   26.59   
Minimum 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 66.67 
Maximum 100.00 100.00 33.33 100.00 66.67 
 
To accommodate individual heterogeneity in the processing of choice experiments, we included in the 
survey two methods that elicit respondents’ attribute processing strategies (APSs). The first method 
involves supplementary self-stated response questions on whether particular attributes were ignored. This 
method will minimise the risk of over-simplifying the SC design because some respondents may require 
all the information to make meaningful choices and some may require information that may be irrelevant 
to others (Hensher et al., 2007; Puckett and Hensher, 2008) – this is highly possible in our study because 
it is about understanding the choice of decision makers from diverse backgrounds. Further, this method 
acknowledges that varying APSs may be enacted not only across decision makers, but also across choice 
situations faced by a given decision maker.  
Figure 14 shows an example of the supplementary APS screens. In such screens, which are shown 
immediately after each choice situation and contain attribute levels that are identical to the choice 
scenario, respondents are asked to click on the attributes that they ignored during the experiment (the 
upper panel in Figure 14). An attribute could be ignored within some alternatives but not within others, 
hence the APS task involved respondents indicating which attributes were ignored for each alternative (it 
could be a particular level of an attribute they were ignoring). Another issue to take into account, given 
the interest in the risk perceptions of two vastly different cohorts, involved asking each respondent to 
click on the attributes that they thought the other party would ignore when making their decision (see the 
lower panel of Figure 14).  
The second method involved the inclusion of an opt-out or null alternative (Rose and Hess, 2009; 
Hensher, 2010) – an additional response question was added to each of the choice scenario screens: 
“Would you accept the contract you prefer if it actually existed?” (see Figure 12). This gave respondents a 
choice to not choose any of the contracts on offer.  
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Figure 14:  Stated choice experiment - attribute processing screen 
Descriptive data of APSs 
In each supplementary APS screen, respondents selected the attribute levels that they ignored (‘ignored by 
self’) when making decisions on the contract choice based on the hypothetical scenario immediately 
before the APS screen, as well as the attribute levels they thought that the other party would ignore 
(‘ignored by other’). In giving reasons why an attribute was ignored, statements provided by respondents 
indicate that various APSs were used to select the preferred choice. The most common reasons are: 
• the risk hardly materialises, e.g., force majeure (upside) 
• the risk has been transferred out 
• the risk exists regardless, e.g., public perception  
• the risk is beyond their control, e.g., political risk (mainly with politicians, not with public sector 
authorities or private consortium) 
• the risk is too trivial to be of concern, e.g., 5 per cent  
• the risk levels are identical in both contract 
The statistics shows that in 19 per cent of cases, of which 56 per cent are from PUBLIC, respondents 
stated that they considered all attribute levels in their decision making. Again, this result confirms that 
PUBLIC are (slightly) more cautious in committing to long-term contracts. Unlike the private operator, 
who can sell their right to manage the tollroad facility, the public sector’s options to make alternative use 
of the facility are constrained by the specificity of the asset. It seems that the public sector is more likely 
to be confronted with lock-in problems.  
In stating their own attribute non-attendance (ANA) (Figure 15), both cohorts exhibited the same levels of 
attention (indicated by the numbers inside the columns) to traffic (9 for both sectors), financial (8 for both 
sectors) and network (7 for both sectors) risks. The fact that respondents from both sectors gave the same 
levels of attention to these three risks refutes what is often construed: that the public sector does not care 
about the economic benefits of a project because many of the related risks are transferred out. Interview 
data confirm that the economics of all projects had been carefully evaluated by the responsible public 
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authorities before tenders were put to the market. Most PUBLIC maintained that only projects that have 
the potential to self-sustain economically – an important criterion to minimise budget uncertainty – would 
be considered for the PPP procurement method.  
 
 
Figure 15:  ANA by self – PUBLIC vs. PRIVATE 
There are discernable misalignments in levels of attention given to sovereign risk and media risk. Most 
PUBLIC who have only worked for one government did not consider sovereignty a risk (ANA of almost 4 
per cent). But sovereign risk is the matter of most concern for PRIVATE; many maintained that they 
would not invest in a politically unstable environment. The reason that this strong averseness to sovereign 
risk is not clearly shown in the data is because 97 per cent of PRIVATE insisted that they only invested in 
countries where there is a well-developed legal system to ensure their contracts with the state will be 
honoured. From time to time, media coverage places government under public scrutiny, which has a 
powerful influence on a citizen’s voting preference (ANA is 2.76), whereas the extent of media coverage 
on the private sector is not as strong, and it is the most ignored risk by PRIVATE (ANA is 4.06 per cent).  
As illustrated in Figure 16 and Figure 17, there exists, unfortunately, noticeable disparity in perceptions of 
ANA by the other party. The degree of misunderstanding by PRIVATE with respect to PUBLIC’s 
preference is much larger than its counterpart – up to five times for traffic risk (i.e., 3.24 per cent vs. 0.6 
per cent in Figure 16).  
PRIVATE believed that PUBLIC would care most about social risks, such as risk of public perception, 
political and reputational risk and media risk. But contrary to PRIVATE’s perception, PUBLIC paid as 
much attention to project-specific risks as their private counterparts. Respondents from road authorities 
impressed upon us that their risk analysis was steered by the objective of assuring certainty in budget and 
project delivery. Consequently, all projects that are placed in the market must have undergone in-house 
feasibility analysis to ensure that they are economically attractive to private investment; thus, before a 
procurement method decision is made, their primary focus is on project risks.  
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Figure 16:  ANA by PUBLIC – by self vs. by PRIVATE 
 
 
Figure 17:  ANA by PRIVATE – by self vs. by PUBLIC 
Figure 17 shows that PUBLIC misunderstood the importance of sovereign risk to the private sector – it 
was ranked by PUBLIC the least-attended risk. The 3.57 per cent in the blue column associated with 
sovereign risk is the highest among the percentages associated with other blue columns. Interview data 
have confirmed that many PUBLIC have strong confidence that their jurisdiction offers a safe and stable 
PPP environment for private investment.  
Descriptive data of level of focus 
After identifying the ANA, respondents were asked to further rank the levels of risk that they foucused on 
(the screen is provided in Figure 18; 3=most focus, 1=least focus); this was repeated for each choice 
situation. Overall, the evidence suggests that although respondents from different sectors share a similar 
averseness to downside risk, there are large differences in the distribution of attention to risk levels by 
each sector.  
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Figure 18:  Level of focus 
In the ‘ALL’ category illustrated in Figure 19, downside risk draws the greatest amount of attention (focus 
level=3, 24.95 per cent); upside gain tops the ranking in focus level=2 (15.05 per cent); and risk-neutral 
takes out the highest proportion in the least-focused category (focus level=1, 18.15 per cent). The 
evidence suggests that all respondents are concerned with the variability in risk distribution, while a 
project with fairly stable risk distribution as indicated by its risk-neutrality causes the least concern to 
respondents.  
Among a quarter (24.95 per cent) of respondents who devoted their focus to downside risk (most 
focus=3), a majority (64.29 per cent) is from the private sector. The smallest difference in the distribution 
of attention level is found in ‘least focused on downside risk’ (55.56 per cent vs. 44.44 per cent) and 
‘most focused on upside gain’ (55.42 per cent vs. 44.58 per cent). Only 2.38 per cent of respondents did 
not care about downside risk as much (least focus=1). Although there is an almost equal proportion of 
PUBLIC and PRIVATE (55.42 per cent and 44.58 per cent) ranking this category as the highest level 
(upside gain: 3), their reasons of focus are quite the opposite.  
PUBLIC feared that too much financial upside gain in the project will draw poor publicity, because there 
have been cases in which the public perceived the government as handing over a money-making project to 
profit-making private operator. As for Motorway 407 in Toronto, public opinion considers that the project 
should be retained in public hands and procured via traditional methods rather than a PPP.  
On the other hand, PRIVATE believed that a project’s upside gain is the risk premium that rewards the 
private sector for taking on project risks. An alternative explanation is that some private consortia believe 
that upside gains are a good selling point to raise project finance; it is particularly appealing to equity 
investors (such belief has at times translated into optimism bias), and our data support this.  
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Figure 19:  Ranking of focus level – distributions of PUBLIC, PRIVATE and ALL 
Many respondents commented that construction companies and investment banks displayed a risk-seeking 
tendency in their evaluation of PPP tollroads. If this perception were true, then our data should show that 
these companies would focus most on the upside gain, but this is not reflected in our data. According to 
Figure 20, consultants are more likely to be risk seekers; this is consistent with our interpretation of 
Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 20:  Ranking of focus on upside gain = 3 by PRIVATE15
Part 4: Prior experience as the reference level 
 
The design 
In addition to the choice experiment that provides the variability to parameterise the source of risks, a 
reference point is needed to define the level for calculating the PPPRI. In the screen shown in Figure 21, 
the respondents were asked to complete the boxes for downside risk and upside gain for each risk, based 
on their prior experience in relation to risks borne. The percentage of the risk-neutral attribute was 
automatically calculated after the data were entered into the other two boxes, so the percentages across the 
three boxes sum to 100.  
 
                                                          
15 Only the seven highest numbers that rank upside gain=3 are displayed. 
Downside Risk: 3 
(most)
Risk Neutral: 1 
(least)
Upside Gain: 2 Upside Gain: 1 
(least)
Risk Neutral: 2 Downside Risk: 2 Upside Gain: 3 
(most)
Risk Neutral: 3 
(most)
Downside Risk: 1 
(least)
35.71%
40.36% 39.47% 40.21%
32.80%
59.34%
44.58%
75.00%
44.44%
64.29%
59.64% 60.53% 59.79%
67.20%
40.66%
55.42%
25.00%
55.56%
24.95%
18.15%
15.05%
12.81% 12.28%
6.01% 5.48%
2.90% 2.38%
PUBLIC PRIVATE ALL
Contractual approach to optimising risk sharing:  A quantitative study of the multidimensional nature of risk 
in private provision of road infrastructure. 
Chung, Hensher and Rose 
 
26 
 
 
Figure 21:  Revealed preference data – prior experience 
Descriptive data of prior experience  
Table 3 contrasts the mean values of PUBLIC and PRIVATE for each risk attribute. The contrast shows 
that respondents have experienced inequitable risk-sharing. The PRIVAT have mostly borne downside 
risks associated with traffic volume (54.07 per cent) and financial return (45.47 per cent), with their shares 
of the related upside gain (17.38 for traffic upside gain and 22.30 per cent for financial gain) being far less 
than the losses they have suffered.  
Downside risk of unclear project objecitves appears to have a much worse impact on PUBLIC (33.24 per 
cent) relative to PRIVATE (18.60 per cent). The higher mean values associated with PUBLIC for 
downside risks of a social dimension, such as political and reputational, media and public perception, 
suggest that these risks rest mainly with the public sector.  
  
Contractual approach to optimising risk sharing:  A quantitative study of the multidimensional nature of risk 
in private provision of road infrastructure. 
Chung, Hensher and Rose 
 
27 
 
Table 3:  Prior experience of risk borne (contrast of mean) 
  PUBLIC PRIVATE Ratio 
  Mean (%) Mean (%) PRIVATE/PUBLIC 
Traffic_downside risk (TRAD) 14.15 54.07 3.82 
Traffic_upside gain (TRAU) 11.37 17.38 1.53 
Financial_downside risk (FIND) 13.41 45.47 3.39 
Financial_upside gain (FINU) 15.20 22.30 1.47 
Network_downside risk (NETD) 19.32 22.78 1.18 
Network_upside gain (NETU) 21.15 31.50 1.49 
Force majeure_downside risk (FORD) 21.88 14.57 0.67 
Force majeure_upside gain (FORU) 5.98 8.12 1.36 
Sovereign_downside risk (SOVD) 23.90 17.40 0.73 
Sovereign_upside gain (SOVU) 7.93 9.63 1.21 
Unclear project objectives_downside risk (UNCD) 33.24 18.60 0.56 
Unclear project objectives_upside gain (UNCU) 12.20 16.43 1.35 
Political and reputational_downside risk (POLD) 39.20 21.87 0.56 
Political and reputational_upside gain (POLU) 13.41 21.03 1.57 
Media_downside risk (MEDD) 41.17 25.13 0.61 
Media_upside gain (MEDU) 13.10 18.05 1.38 
Public perception_downside risk (PUBD) 45.37 27.63 0.61 
Public perception_upside gain (PUBU) 12.68 20.57 1.62 
 
In Table 4 we compare the risk percentage with the highest count between PUBLIC and PRIVATE, 
revealing that 13.33 per cent of PRIVATE have suffered the consequence of traffic demand being 60 per 
cent lower than forecast (see TRAD under PRIVATE). Prima facie, the real gain for the private sector 
stems from an innovative financing solution – the number of PRIVATE who have reaped the benefits 
from financial upside gain (18.33 per cent, see FINU under PRIVATE) is 3.33 per cent higher than the 
number of PRIVATE who have suffered from financial downside risk (15 per cent, see FIND under 
PRIVATE).  
Network risk, however, has generated a negative experience for a greater number of PRIVATE (28.33 per 
cent, see NETD under PRIVATE) than the number of PRIVATE who have gained (16.67 per cent, see 
NETU under PRIVATE) from changes made to the surrounding transport network by government. The 
majority of the PUBLIC on the other hand, have experienced little gain or loss in matters related to traffic 
numbers, project finance and network developments.  
A number of interesting observations can be made from the evidence in Table 3 and Table 4. As indicated 
by the higher proportion of PRIVATE in POLD, adverse public opinion toward a project has a harder 
impact on the reputation of some PRIVATE, although the average impact on PUBLIC is greater (see 
Table 3). Media exposure has negatively affected both sectors, but the effect was felt more deeply by 
PUBLIC (see MEDD under PUBLIC in Table 4).  
We will revisit the effects of these risks on repondents’ choice of procurement methods through the 
testing of H4. 
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Table 4:  Prior experience of risk borne  
(comparison of risk percentage with the highest count) 
  PUBLIC PRIVATE 
 
risk % with the 
highest count count %=count/41 
risk % with the 
highest count count %=count/60 
TRAD 0 20 48.78 60 8 13.33 
TRAU 0 18 43.90 0 13 21.67 
FIND 0 21 51.22 20 9 15.00 
FINU 0 13 31.71 20 11 18.33 
NETD 0 10 24.39 10 17 28.33 
NETU 0 10 24.39 10 10 16.67 
FORD 0 17 41.46 0 21 35.00 
FORU 0 31 75.61 0 33 55.00 
SOVD 0 12 29.27 0 21 35.00 
SOVU 0 27 65.85 0 29 48.33 
UNCD 0 7 17.07 0 14 23.33 
UNCU 0 22 53.66 0 19 31.67 
POLD 10 6 14.63 20 14 23.33 
POLU 0 14 34.15 0 16 26.67 
MEDD 50 9 21.95 10 11 18.33 
MEDU 0 12 29.27 0 19 31.67 
PUBD 10 5 12.20 10 11 18.33 
PUBU 10 13 31.71 0 19 31.67 
Part 5: Attitudinal questions 
The design 
To further understand stakeholders’ personal views on optimal risk-sharing arrangments, we included 
attitudinal questions seeking respondents’ views on risk-sharing in PPP tollroads. In the screen presented 
in Figure 22, each respondent rated the extent to which each of the nine risks had been adequately dealt 
with in the PPP tollroad contracts that they had been involved in, by rating them on a 1-to-7 likert scale 
(1=not very well; 7=very well).  
We designed a second set of attitudinal questions to obtain a feeling about respondents’ preference for the 
PPP procurement method. In Figure 23, respondents rated on a 1-to-7 likert scale whether they preferred 
PPPs over other methods (1=PPPs are the most preferred method; 7=other methods are the most preferred 
or PPPs are the least preferred).  
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Figure 22:  Attitudinal questions (1)  
 
Figure 23:  Attitudinal questions (2) Screen 
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Descriptive data  
Views on optimal risk-sharing  
The chart in Figure 24 contrasts the mean values of the ratings by PUBLIC with those of PRIVATE. The 
largest difference exists in their views on traffic risk: views of PRIVATE on optimal sharing of traffic risk 
are well distributed across the 7-point scale, whereas opinions shared among the PUBLIC are quite 
different (see Figure 25). Repsondents provided a number of accounts for the differing views in the 
‘reason’ section.  
(1=not well at all, 7=very well) 
 
Figure 24:  Personal view on risk-sharing – contrast of mean  
(1=not well at all, 7=very well) 
 
Figure 25:  Personal views on optimal sharing of traffic risk –PUBLIC vs. PRIVATE 
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Some PUBLIC believed that over-transferring traffic risk to the private sector would be to the detriment 
of the PPP policy. Although benefiting the government, transferring too much risk to the private sector is 
not good for the whole road network, or the PPP, and government should consider the bigger picture. 
Some PUBLIC considered that technical error was partly to be blamed for the poor handling of traffic risk 
in contracts. Others critiqued that traffic demand was driven by strategic motivations associated with the 
structure of the consortium and bidding process, leading to unrealistic traffic forecasts. 
Preferred procurement method 
On average, PUBLIC – with a mean value of 3.49 compared with 2.37 for PRIVATE – appear to be more 
in favour of PPPs over other methods. But Figure 26 shows that there is a much higher proportion of 
PRIVATE that prefer PPPs (71.67 per cent in ratings 1 and 2 combined) than PUBLIC (24.39 per cent in 
ratings 1 and 2 combined). The rating is related to any PPP project, not just tollroads. Many respondents 
held the view that the choice of procurement method should depend on the project, its characteristics, and 
the availability of government funding. To investigate further what affects respondents’ choice of 
procurement methods, we will test a range of variables against the choice of procurement as the dependent 
variable in the next section.  
(1=PPP most preferred model, 7=PPP least preferred model) 
 
Figure 26:  Prefer procurement method – PUBLIC vs. PRIVATE 
Part 6: Other factors 
The design 
This is part six of the CAPI survey; data were collected through the screen depicted in Figure 27. 
We acknowledge that in addition to risks pertinent to PPP tollroads, there are a number of considerations 
that may influence stakeholder decisions on entering into a contract. At the time of the survey design, the 
world was experiencing a significant economic downturn caused by the GFC. In particular, the crisis 
substantially impacted on lenders’ ability and willingness to invest. Further, during the pilot study, it was 
drawn to our attention that the availability model and the responsibility of land acquisition are two 
important considerations in countries outside Australia.  
The addition of these two variables to our factor list has enhanced the international relevance of the study. 
The mean values16 Table 5 reported in  show that PUBLIC and PRIVATE share similar views on the 
importance of these factors. 
                                                          
16 The data were collected through a 1-to-7 likert scale: 1 indicates that the factor is very unimportant, whereas 7 indicates that the factor is 
very important. 
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Figure 27:  Other factors of influence 
Table 5:  Other factors – PUBLIC vs. PRIVATE 
 PUBLIC 
(mean) 
PRIVATE 
(mean) 
Global financial crisis (GFC) 5.51 5.83 
Future growth of private provision in transport infrastructure (FGROWTH) 5.12 5.62 
Freedom of the private operator to set toll pricing (FREETOLL) 3.07 4.05 
Duration of the tollroad concession (DURATION) 4.59 5.05 
Performance standards embedded in the tollroad concession (PERSDR) 5.90 5.47 
Financial penalties imposed on failing to meet performance standards (FPENALTY) 5.44 5.03 
Private ownership to help government keeping workforce at arms length (PVOWNW) 3.10 4.18 
Private ownership as a way of making it easier to charge users a toll (PVOWNT) 3.15 3.58 
Proper toll pricing to manage traffic demand (TPRICETD) 5.83 5.32 
The sharing of toll revenue with the other party (TRSHARE)) 4.17 4.05 
The availability model to incentivise efficient performance during the operational phase 
(AM) 
4.75 4.00 
Land acquisition risk is borne by government (LAND) 5.63 5.50 
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5. Derived risk index and hypothesis testing 
RQ1: Public-Private-Partnership risk index  
We estimated a LCM by pooling both segments of data, i.e., PUBLIC and PRIVATE.17
A respondent is risk-averse if the outcome of Equation (1) is negative; a respondent is risk-seeking if 
the outcome is positive; and a respondent is risk-neutral if the outcome is zero. 
 After the 
weights are identified, we multiply each attribute level associated with the RP data in ‘prior 
experience’ by the relevant weight, and sum these calculations across all attributes for each of the 101 
respondents to produce the sector-specific risk index as specified in Equation (1).  
The values of risk indices associated with PUBLIC (PUBRI) are in the range of -18.53 per cent and 
zero per cent, with a mean value of -7.26 per cent; the range of risk indices associated with PRIVATE 
(PRVRI) lies between -56.98 per cent and -3.47 per cent, with a mean value of -23.15 per cent. These 
results suggest that all but one PUBLIC, who displays risk neutrality, are risk-averse. None displays a 
risk-seeking preference, not even consultants or construction companies, as we had suspected. We 
convert all indices into the positive range by normalising the index of the PUBRI (PRVRI) with the 
highest relative value to a base of zero (see Figure 28).18
 
  
 
Figure 28:  Risk indices – PUBRI versus PRVRI 
Figure 28 clearly illustrates that PRIVATE are, on average, much more risk-averse than PUBLIC; the 
average risk index of the agent (23.15 per cent) is more than three times higher than that of the 
principal (7.26 per cent). This is supported by the t-test in Equation 2, where the two index values are 
statistically different from each other at the one per cent level.   
 
 
(2) 
 
                                                          
17 We specified two latent classes, but changes in class did not improve model fit nor increase the number of significant parameters. 
Results are available on request from the first author.  
18 From this point onward, all analysis will be based on normalised indices; i.e., risk aversion indices are presented in positive values; 
higher value means greater risk aversion.   
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Differences in risk preference associated with specific risk attribute 
To understand the differences in risk preference across the two sector cohorts using the parameter 
estimates of the LCM model with two classes, we converted each risk attribute from two classes, i.e., 
 and , (q denotes class) into a single  , and applied the Krinsky and Robb (1986) 
procedure19
The results depicted in 
 to generate confidence intervals (CIs) for  and  in order to test 
whether =  .  
Figure 29 were generated using the estimated CIs. The figure plots the 
parameter estimates that are significant for both cohorts20
In order to make a comparison, we scaled the mean value of by the ratio of  , 
and multiplied the inverse of this ratio by the mean value of . Results are presented in 
 to illustrate whether the CIs overlap. The 
figure shows that six out of seven significant risk preferences associated with PUBLIC are 
significantly different from their PRIVATE counterparts at the five per cent level i.e., 95 per cent of 
CIs of the two data segments do not cross.  
Table 6. 
Table 6:  Degree of differences in risk preferences 
 
Column A:  Column B:  Column C:  
    
TRAD 0.66 -0.06 2.29 
FIND 0.72 -0.03 3.93 
UNCU 0.82 0.02 2.53 
POLD 2.80 -0.01 1.64 
MEDD 0.02 -0.09 -0.64 
MEDU 0.01 1.28 0.05 
    
 
As shown in Table 6, after scaling, the differences associated with MEDD and MEDU become 
negligible; however, significant differences remain in each cohort’s risk preference in TRAD, FIND, 
UNCU and POLD. The implications are as follows. 
 
Traffic risk downside (TRAD) 
Respondents from both sectors are averse to this risk, but they are significantly different in terms of 
their degree of risk aversion – results in Table 7 suggest that PRIVATE are 2.3 times more averse to 
the risk than PUBLIC.  
                                                          
19 Assistance from Matthew Beck of ITLS to perform the Krinsky and Robb procedure is much appreciated. 
20 Results generated from the Krinsky and Robb procedure are available on request from the first author. 
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Figure 29:  Confidence Intervals – test of differences in risk preferences (PUBLIC vs. PRIVATE) 
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Financial risk downside (FIND) 
PRIVATE are overwhelmingly (four times) more averse to financial downside risk compared with 
PUBLIC. Examination of Table 7 reveals that the largest difference between the two cohorts lies in 
this category. This is not a surprising result because PPPs are essentially a means of project finance, 
and financial risk is one that governments want to divest the most, therefore exposing private capital to 
a great deal of risk. 
Unclear project objectives upside (UNCU) 
PRIVATE are three times more in favour of well-defined projects compared with PUBLIC; this sends 
a strong message to public procurers. Projects with good planning and clear objectives can facilitate 
the fulfilment of policy goals. A favourable perception from PRIVATE suggests that such projects can 
drive risk premiums down; so clear project objectives are a key driver of VFM.  
Political and reputational risk downside (POLD) 
Here, the difference between the two cohorts arises as the result of PUBLIC being almost twice as 
averse to the risk than PRIVATE. This finding implies that both sectors are wary of the repercussions 
from political backlash due to the controversial nature of the PPP scheme. It signals to both sectors 
that the scheme’s welcomeness, to a large extent, can be enhanced through having ongoing dialogue 
with users and with the community.  
RQ2: Risk preferences and choice of procurement method 
Armed with the knowledge of respondents’ risk preferences, we are able to proceed to answer RQ2. 
Since respondents’ choice of procurement method, as depicted in Figure 23, are presented in an 
ordered outcome scale of seven levels, we ran two ordered logit models to investigate the relationship 
between PUBRI (PRVRI) and their preferred procurement method, because an ordered response 
model recognises the nonlinearity of a ranking scale and defines points on the observed rating scale as 
thresholds (µs) (Jones and Hensher, 2004). The results are presented in Table 7. 
A direct interpretation of the parameter estimates in Table 7 is not possible given the logit 
transformation of the outcome-dependent variable required for model estimation. We therefore 
provide in the table the marginal effects of the two ends of the scale, i.e., Prob(Y=1) (PPP is the most 
preferred method) and Prob(Y=7) (PPP is the least preferred method). These are defined as the 
derivatives of the probabilities, to explain the influence a one unit change in an independent variable, 
i.e., risk aversion, has on the probability of selecting a particular outcome, i.e., choice of procurement 
method, ceteris paribus.    
From Table 7, the number of threshold parameters associated with PUBRI is five instead of six 
because the ranking scale of seven by PUBLIC has zero entries (see Figure 26). The parameter 
estimates of marginal effects are statistically significant at the five per cent level suggesting PUBRI 
has a substantial impact on PUBLIC’s choice of procurement methods. The positive marginal effect of 
Prob(Y=1) (0.29074) and negative marginal effect of Prob(Y=6) (-0.28862) indicate that an increase 
in risk aversion of PUBLIC increases their preference for the PPP method and decreases their 
preference for other methods at a similar magnitude. For example, a one unit increase in PUBRI will 
increase the probability of PPP being the most preferred method by 29 per cent ceteris paribus while 
decreasing the preference for other methods by 29 per cent ceteris paribus.  
PRVRI has a strong statistical but opposite impact on the preference of PRIVATE for PPPs. Both 
marginal effects are significant at the one per cent level on the probability of choosing PPP as the most 
preferred procurement method. The negative marginal effect of Prob(Y=1) indicates that a one unit 
change in the mean of PRVRI leads to a -0.56 change in the probability of Y=1, i.e., one unit increase 
in the risk aversion of PRIVATE reduces the probability of PPP being favoured by them by 56 per 
cent, ceteris paribus. The positive marginal effect of Prob(Y=7) suggests otherwise, although at a 
much lower magnitude, i.e., a one unit increase in risk aversion increases the odds of non-PPP 
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methods being chosen by four per cent, ceteris paribus. Overall, the results suggest that the greater the 
risk aversion of PRIVATE the less
Table 7:  PPP method versus PUBRI/PRVRI 
 preferred is the PPP method.  
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable Parameter t-value Independent Variable Parameter t-value 
           
Choice of PPP 
procurement 
method  
Constant 2.85525 (15.94) Constant -0.00114 (-0.01) 
PUBRI -4.30202 (-2.08) PRVRI 2.41940 (3.77) 
Threshold 
parameters 
  Threshold parameters   
µ (1 to 2) MU (1) 0  µ (1 to 2) MU (1) 0  
µ (2 to 3) MU (2) 1.41340 (14.08) µ (2 to 3) MU (2) 1.50508 (18.22) 
µ (3 to 4) MU (3) 2.20078 (22.18) µ (3 to 4) MU (3) 1.86967 (20.15) 
µ (4 to5)  MU (4) 4.31891 (30.55) µ (4 to 5) MU (4) 2.61391 (21.14) 
 µ (5 to 6) MU (5) 5.09460 (26.83) µ (5 to 6) MU (5) 2.78739 (20.98) 
    µ (6 to 7) MU (6) 4.67470 (14.69) 
       
 Marginal effects   Marginal effects   
 Independent 
variable Prob(Y=1) t-value Independent variable Prob (Y=1) 
 
t-value 
PUBRI (at mean) 0.29074 (2.05)  PRVRI (at mean) -0.55997 (-3.75)  
  Prob(Y=6)  t-value Prob (Y=7) 
 
t-value 
 -0.28862 (-2.03)  0.03821 (3.30) 
       
 AIC 1269.66300  AIC 1787.60500  
 LL function -628.83175  LL function -886.80233  
 N  41  N 60  
       
 
In short, these results suggest that the PPP method has in the past yielded better outcomes for PUBLIC 
in terms of risk-sharing, whereas they have not been viewed favourably by PRIVATE, as reflected by 
their preferences for the procurement method between PPPs and other alternatives. 
Within the PPP umbrella, there exist different compensation structures, one of which is the availability 
payment (AM), which involves a series of periodic payments of a fixed sum to the concessionaire as 
long as their performance satisfies the prescribed standards. Prima facie, the purpose of the fixed-price 
contract in PPPs is to remove revenue uncertainty for the agent so that they will exert greater effort in 
managing performance risks. An implicit but overpowering purpose of the AM is its budget certainty 
to the responsible public authority. From an incentive viewpoint, a fixed-price compensation has the 
private sector agent bearing all the cost of operations and maintenance (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001) 
leaving them with all of the risk of cost uncertainty.  
Based on the marginal effects of PRVRI on the AM from an ordered logit model (Table 8), the 
marginal effects of -0.13 for Prob(Y=1) and 0.23 for Prob(Y=7), suggest that the more risk-averse is 
the PRIVATE, the less effective is the AM to induce them to exert greater performance effort.  
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Table 8:  Risk aversion versus preference for availability model 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable Parameter  t-value 
        
AM  
(descriptive statistics are 
reported in Table 5) 
Constant 1.63782 (9.48) 
PRVRI 1.21517 (1.92) 
Threshold parameters   
 µ (1 to 2) MU (1) 0  
 µ (2 to 3) MU (2) 0.75994 (10.31) 
 µ (3 to 4) MU (3) 1.04253 (13.74) 
 µ (4 to 5) MU (4) 1.89818 (23.65) 
 µ (5 to 6) MU (5) 2.26617 (27.30) 
 µ (6 to 7) MU (6) 3.01077 (30.29) 
 Marginal effects   
 Independent variable Prob (Y=1) 
 
t-value 
PRVRI (at mean) -0.13476 (-1.90)  
  Prob (Y=7) 
 
t-value 
 0.22959 (1.92) 
    
 AIC 2042.06900  
 LL function -1014.03447  
 N  55  
    
NB: N= (60-5); 5 PRIVATE took the pilot survey, questions related to AM and Land (see Figure 
27) was added as the result of feedback from the pilot 
    
 
Figure 30 compares the risk indices of respondents from construction companies, who generally lead 
the consortium bid team, with that of the other members of the bidding consortium. The comparison 
shows that the leader is less risk-averse (the mean value is 21.97 per cent) compared with other 
members of the bid team, whose mean value is 26.09 per cent.  
This evidence suggests there is a second level of agency problem in that the leader can pass on risks to 
other members of the consortium. This problem is further supported by test results of a linear 
regression model summarised in Table 9, which demonstrates that construction companies are the least 
risk-averse among all members of the consortium.  
The results are consistent with our earlier analysis that construction companies and consultants are 
most aggressive in making investment decisions.  
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Figure 30:  Risk Indices – consortium leader versus other members of the consortium  
 
Table 9: Second level of agency problem within members of consortium team  
Dependent Variable Independent Variable Parameter t-value Adjusted R2 
          
PRVRI Constant 0.09580 (16.58) 0.20805 
  Construction Company 0.02972 (3.24)  
  Consultancy 0.03581 (4.46)  
  Investment Bank 0.07433 (7.20)  
  Tollroad Company 0.07928 (10.10)  
  Other Organisation 0.08595 (10.03)  
     
 N  60   
          
 
Hypothesis testing 
Theory of incomplete contract 
Here we test the effect of property rights on the incentives of contracting parties. We test this 
proposition from the private sector agent’s perspective in a number of dimensions: (a) ownership 
effect on protecting PRIVATE from unclear project objectives; (b) ownership effect on the willingness 
of PRIVATE to exercise pricing control; and (c) reaction of PRIVATE to public perception that 
ownership transfer is seen transferring government’s accountability for issues related to labour 
productivity. Results are reported in Table 10.  
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Table 10: Ownership effects on PRIVATE 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
 
Parameter t-value Adjusted R2 Hypothesis Reject Model 
                 
PRVRI 
 
Constant  0.20622 (27.54) 0.09180    
UNCD2  0.00180 (7.65)  1a NO Multivariate 
linear 
regression  
FREETOLLD2  0.04292 (2.97)  2a YES 
PVOWNWD2  -0.02727 (-2.88)  3a YES 
N   600    
         
Choice of 
PPP 
Procure-
ment 
Method 
Constant  0.72181 (6.92) N/A 1b NO Ordered 
logit 
  
UNCD2  -0.00899 (-2.36) N/A   
Threshold parameters      
µ (1 to 2) MU (1) 0      
µ (2 to 3) MU (2) 1.48719 (18.15)     
µ (3 to 4) MU (3) 1.84805 (20.07)     
µ (4 to 5) MU (4) 2.59356 (21.05)     
 µ (5 to 6) MU (5) 2.76775 (20.90)     
 µ (6 to 7) MU (6) 4.64902 (14.62)     
 Marginal effects       
 Independent variable Prob (Y=1) t-value Prob (Y=7)  t-value  
  UNCD2 (at mean) 0.00208 (2.36)  -0.00014 (-2.23)    
        
 AIC 1796.03700     
 LL function -891.01858     
 N  600     
        
 
Data of UNCD2 are downside risk of unclear project objectives of PRIVATE from ‘prior experience’ 
(see Figure 21 and Table 3). Data of FREETOLLD2 and PVOWNWD2 are the 1-7 likert scale from 
‘other factors’ (see Figure 27 and Table 5) and have been coded into dummy variables.  
The parameter estimate of UNCD2 (0.00180) is highly significant at the one per cent level. The positive 
sign signals that the higher the risk of unclear project objectives by the procuring authority, the greater 
the risk aversion of PRIVATE; so H1a cannot be rejected.  
After the significance of UNCD2 had been confirmed, we estimated an ordered logit model to analyse 
whether ownership transfer has the effect of shielding PRIVATE from the risk, by testing UNCD2 
against their choice of procurement method. The positive (negative) marginal effect of Pro(Y=1) 
0.00208 (Prob(Y=7), -0.00014) indicates that the higher the risk of unclear project objectives, the 
more preferred is the PPP method by PRIVATE; hence, H1b is not rejected.  
Unclear project objectives by the public sector have in the past provided PRIVATE with greater 
opportunities to exercise their own discretion in terms of project scope and delivery; which may 
explain the preference of PRIVATE for PPPs because only PPPs give them the ownership freedom to 
make decisions for uncontracted for events.  
 
Contractual approach to optimising risk sharing:  A quantitative study of the multidimensional nature of 
risk in private provision of road infrastructure. 
Chung, Hensher and Rose 
 
41 
 
The right to price control yields an effect similar to UNCD2. The positive parameter of FREETOLLD2 
(0.04033)21
PPPs are often perceived by the public as a facilitating mechanism for governments to transfer 
ownership-related risks, such as those arising from workforce disputes (PVOWNW). The parameter 
estimate of PVOWNWD2 is significant at the one per cent level and is of negative sign. This means the 
higher the public perception, the lower the risk aversion of PRIVATE, so H3a is rejected. 
, which is significant at the one per cent level, shows that such ownership right increases 
the risk aversion of PRIVATE. We therefore reject H2a and conclude that PRIVATE are reluctant to 
exercise their entitlement to pricing control. The reason for this could be due to strong public 
averseness to toll pricing, and the private proponents not wishing to be seen to be using their right to 
set tolls for private gain at the expense of the public purse, which may have a detrimental effect on 
patronage.  
Table 11 reports the results of testing ICT from the perspective of PUBLIC. All parameter estimates 
are significant at the one per cent level, signalling that ownership effects also have a significant impact 
on PUBLIC. The positive sign of UNCD1 (0.00093) confirms that PUBLIC dislike the risk of unclear 
project objectives, as the higher the risk, the greater their risk aversion. Accordingly, H1c is not 
rejected.  
Table 11:  Ownership effects on PUBLIC 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable Parameter t-value 
Adjusted 
R2 Hypothesis Reject Model 
               
PUBRI 
 
Constant 0.03760 (16.84) 0.57676    
UNCD1 0.00093 (19.68)  1c NO Multivariate 
linear 
regression   
FREETOLLD1 0.01005 (3.06)  2b YES 
 PVOWNWD1 0.04454 (4.39)  3b NO 
  N   410     
                
 NB: FREETOLLD1 combines scale=5, 6 and 7; PVOWNWD1 combines scale=6 and 7. 
        
 
The positive sign of FREETOLLD1 (0.01005) means we reject H2b. ICT argues that when contracting 
parties are risk-averse, reservation of residual rights is most likely. Our data strongly upholds this 
proposition. Both cohorts are confirmed as risk-averse and are found to be restrained to 
exercise/release the right to price control. This finding represents a significant empirical contribution 
to the literature of property rights as it demonstrates that the effectiveness of ownership assignment as 
an incentive device hinges on the contracting parties’ risk preferences. When both the agent and the 
principal are risk-averse, property rights to ex post surplus have little effect in incentivising the agent, 
and at the same time secure little support from the principal.  
The positive sign of PVOWNWD1 (0.04454) suggests that the public perception of ownership transfer 
is that accountability transfer increases the risk aversion of PUBLIC, i.e., such perception will have a 
negative effect on the political popularity of the PPP method. More needs to be done to correct these 
misperceptions if PPPs are to gain the public’s support.  
 
                                                          
21 This is interpreted as follows: a PRIVATE who has a scale of 7=1 in FREETOLL has a risk index value that is four per cent greater than 
a PRIVATE with a scale of 1, …, 6=1, other things being equal; a similar interpretation applies to other hypothesis testing using dummies 
as the independent variables.  
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Transaction cost economics 
Institutional framework versus preference for procurement method (the shift parameter 
framework) 
A set of shift parameters (Williamson, 1991) can change the comparative cost of governance, and in 
some cases shift the form of governance (González-Diaz et al., 1998; Oxley, 1999; Arruñada et al., 
2004; 2009). We extend the notion of institutional parameters defined as the set of fundamental 
political, social, and legal rules that sets the boundary within which economic activity takes place 
(North, 1991), to determine a set of shift parameters in the PPP environment. These are sovereign risk 
(which defines the political environment), force majeure (as a proxy of the legal environment), unclear 
project objectives (proxy of political commitment), political and reputational risk (proxy of reputation 
and trust), media risk (proxy of the social perspective of PPPs), and public perception risk (proxy of 
public attitudes toward PPPs).  
We hypothesised that these shift parameters have a significant effect on the choice of procurement 
method by all contracting parties. We test this using the data from ‘prior experience’. Based on the 
results of an ordered logit model summarised in Table 12, we cannot reject H4.  
For PRIVATE, five out of six or 83 per cent of the marginal effects of risks have a strong statistical 
impact on their preference for PPPs; the only insignificant effect is associated with PUBD. For 
PUBLIC, only three out of six or half the marginal effects have a statistical impact on their preference 
for PPPs. The interpretations are summarised in Table 13. 
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Table 12:  Shift parameter framework 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
 PRIVATE(D2) 
 
PUBLIC(D1) 
Parameter t-value Parameter t-value 
       
Choice of PPP 
Procurement 
Method 
Constant  0.31036 (1.98) 3.16797 (17.02) 
FORD  0.01881 (5.30) -0.00829 (-1.88) 
SOVD    -0.00718 (-1.78) -0.00757 (-1.21) 
UNCD  -0.02120 (-4.99) -0.00449 (-0.74) 
 POLD  0.03185 (4.98) -0.00445 (-0.65) 
 MEDD  -0.01634 (-2.59) -0.01535 (-2.23) 
 PUBD  0.00897 (1.46) 0.01742 (3.12) 
 Threshold parameters (only 5 for PUBLIC due to no entries in Y=7) 
 µ (1 to 2) MU (1) 0  0  
 µ (2 to 3) MU (2) 1.59530 (18.45) 1.49282 (14.31) 
 µ (3 to 4) MU (3) 1.98219 (20.50) 2.29667 (22.43) 
 µ (4 to 5) MU (4) 2.78328 (21.85) 4.52372 (31.28) 
 µ (5 to 6) MU (5) 2.96870 (21.73) 5.32128 (27.77) 
  µ (6 to 7) MU (6) 4.88765 (15.29)   
 Marginal effects     
 Independent variable Prob (Y=1) t-value Prob (Y=7) 
 
t-value 
FORD2 (at mean) -0.00430 (-5.24)  0.00025 (4.08) 
 SOVD2 (at mean) 0.00164 (1.78) -0.95877E-04 (-1.69) 
 UNCD2 (at mean) 0.00485 (4.94) -0.00028 (-4.04) 
 POLD2 (at mean) -0.00729 (-4.90) 0.00043 (4.00) 
 MEDD2 (at mean) 0.00374 (2.58) -0.00022 (-2.44) 
 PUBD2 (at mean) -0.00205 (-1.46) 0.00012 (1.43) 
  Prob (Y=1) t-value Prob (Y=6) 
 
t-value 
FORD1 (at mean) 0.00052 (1.82) -0.00050 (-1.85) 
 SOVD1 (at mean) 0.00047 (1.22) -0.00045 (-1.19) 
 UNCD1 (at mean) 0.00028 (0.73) -0.00027 (-0.74) 
 POLD1 (at mean) 0.00028 (0.65) -0.00027 (-0.66) 
 MEDD1 (at mean) 0.00095 (2.21) -0.00092 (-2.13) 
 PUBD1 (at mean) -0.00108 (-3.00) 0.00105 (2.92) 
      
 AIC 1745.12400 1248.28000 
 LL function --860.56183 -613.41015 
 N   60  41 
      
 H4 Reject: NO    
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Table 13:  Interpretation of marginal effects in Table 12 
Shift 
Parameters 
PRIVATED2 
Interpretation (Prob(Y=1)) 
PUBLICD1 
Interpretation (Prob(Y=7)) Interpretation (Prob(Y=1)) Interpretation (Prob(Y=6)) 
FORD 
 
-0.00430 (-5.24) 
Significant at 1% level; 1 unit ↑ 
in the average value of the risk 
experienced will ↓ PRIVATE’s 
preference for PPPs by 0.43%, 
ceteris paribus. 
0.00025 (4.08) 
Significant at 1% level; 1 unit ↑ in 
the average value of the risk 
experienced will ↑ PRIVATE’s 
preference for non-PPPs by 0.03%, 
ceteris paribus. 
0.00052 (1.82) 
Significant at 10% level; 1 unit 
↑ in the average value of the 
risk experienced will ↑ 
PUBLIC’s preference for PPPs 
by 0.05%, ceteris paribus. 
-0.00050 (-1.85) 
Significant at 10% level; 1 unit ↑ 
in the average value of the risk 
experienced will ↓ PUBLIC’s 
preference for non-PPPs by 
0.05%, ceteris paribus.  
 The results across two segments suggest that in the past, the private sector may have taken on greater shares of the risk. A more 
balanced sharing of this risk will strengthen the social benefits that the policy can offer.  
SOVD  0.00164 (1.78) 
Significant at 10% level; 1 unit 
↑ in the average value of the 
risk experienced will ↑ 
PRIVATE’s preference for 
PPPs by 0.16%, ceteris paribus. 
-0.95877E-04 (-1.69) 
Significant at 10% level; 1 unit ↑ in 
the average value of the risk 
experienced will ↓ PRIVATE’s 
preference for non-PPPs by 0.01%, 
ceteris paribus.  
0.00047 (1.22) 
Insignificant  
-0.00045 (-1.19) 
Insignificant  
 The results imply that the PPP projects experienced by PRIVATE 
occurred in countries where supportive policy and legal 
frameworks were present.  
This is consistent with our conclusion drawn from Figure 17; in 
fact, all PUBLIC informed the first author that they believed that 
their political frameworks were mature and stable for PPPs.  
UNCD  0.00485 (4.94) 
Significant at 1% level; 1 unit ↑ 
in the average value of the risk 
experienced will ↑ PRIVATE’s 
preference for PPPs by 0.49%, 
ceteris paribus. 
-0.00028 (4.04) 
Significant at 1% level; 1 unit ↑ in 
the average value of the risk 
experienced will ↓ PRIVATE’s 
preference for non-PPPs by 0.03%, 
ceteris paribus.  
0.00028 (0.73) 
Insignificant  
-0.00027 (-0.74) 
Insignificant  
 The results are consistent with H1b.  
 
This indicates that insufficient consideration was given by public 
authorities to assessing the ramifications of unclear project 
objectives on government’s overall infrastructure planning and 
policy implementation.    
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Shift 
Parameters 
PRIVATED2 
Interpretation (Prob(Y=1)) 
PUBLICD1 
Interpretation (Prob(Y=7)) Interpretation (Prob(Y=1)) Interpretation (Prob(Y=6)) 
POLD -0.00729 (-4.90) 
Significant at 1% level; 1 unit ↑ 
in the average value of the risk 
experienced will ↓ PRIVATE’s 
preference for PPPs by 0.73%, 
ceteris paribus. 
0.00043 (4.00) 
Significant at 1% level; 1 unit ↑ in 
the average value of the risk 
experienced will ↑ PRIVATE’s 
preference for non-PPPs by 0.04%, 
ceteris paribus.  
0.00028 (0.65) 
Insignificant  
-0.00027 (-0.66) 
Insignificant  
 The results across two cohorts offer useful insights into understanding how political risk was perceived by PRIVATE and PUBLIC 
respectively. For PRIVATE, political risk lowers their incentive to invest in PPPs, in particular because PPPs are long-term projects; this 
perception is also reflected in their investing behaviour revealed by SOVD, explained earlier in this table. On the other hand, PUBLIC did 
not consider POLD was an important factor; this is not because they did not believe political risk would have a decisive influence on the 
future of PPPs (in fact they did, as evidenced by the interview data), but rather, the risk was in the hands of politicians and therefore 
beyond their control.   
MEDD  0.00374 (2.58) 
Significant at 1% level; 1 unit ↑ 
in the average value of the risk 
experienced will ↑ PRIVATE’s 
preference for PPPs by 0.37%, 
ceteris paribus. 
-0.00022 (-2.44) 
Significant at 5% level; 1 unit ↑ in 
the average value of the risk 
experienced will ↓ PRIVATE’s 
preference for non-PPPs by 0.02%, 
ceteris paribus.  
0.00095 (2.21) 
Significant at 5% level; 1 unit 
↑ in the average value of the 
risk experienced will ↑ 
PUBLIC’s preference for 
PPPs by 0.10%, ceteris 
paribus. 
-0.00092 (-2.13) 
Significant at 5% level; one unit ↑ in 
the average value of the risk 
experienced will ↓ PUBLIC’s 
preference for non-PPPs by 0.09%, 
ceteris paribus.  
 The results are consistent with our conclusion to RQ1; i.e., the risk is significant to both cohorts and magnitudes of difference are 
negligible. The effects of media risk are similar across the two cohorts, indicating on average that media was supportive of the scheme 
(taking into account experience was collected from 32 countries). This sends a strong signal to all scheme participants, public and private, 
that media is one of the powerful influences to either the success or the demise of the scheme.  
PUBD -0.00205 (-1.46) 
Insignificant  
0.00012 (1.43) 
Insignificant  
-0.00108 (-3.00) 
Significant at 1% level; 1 unit 
↑ in the average value of the 
risk experienced will ↓ 
PUBLIC’s preference for 
PPPs by 0.11%, ceteris 
paribus. 
0.00105 (2.92) 
Significant at 1% level; one unit ↑ in 
the average value of the risk 
experienced will ↑ PUBLIC’s 
preference for non-PPPs by 0.11%, 
ceteris paribus.  
 The results strongly suggest that this risk of social dimension is of primary concern to the public sector. Although past experience related 
to this risk has not generated any significant impact on PRIVATE, it should not be interpreted that this risk should be managed by the 
public sector alone. As we argued in Chung et al. (2010), commitments from the private sector to make the PPP scheme welcome by the 
community can help in reducing the risk. 
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Contract and institutional conditions versus risk preferences 
We call on the Chiles and McMackin (1996) model to incorporate variable risk preferences into the 
TCE framework in order to explain the governance choice as a function of risk preferences. This 
enables us to test the power of influence of uncertainty exerted by institutional factors and contractual 
conditions on each of the sector-specific risk indices respectively. Results shown in Table 14 confirm 
that these variables do have some power of influence on uncertainty (all are significant at the 10 per 
cent level), albeit in different ways with respect to PRVRI and to PUBRI.  
Table 14:  Power of influence of institutional factors and contractual  
conditions on uncertainty 
Dependent Variable PRVRI 
Independent Variables 
PUBRI 
Parameter t-value 
Adjusted 
R2 Parameter t-value Adjusted R2 
Constant 0.21421 (15.05) 0.19264 0.09261 (16.87) 0.34738 
 Institutional Factors 
GFCD2/D1 0.05420 (5.64)   -0.02582 (-3.80)   
FGROWTH D2/D1 -0.03779 (-3.02)   0.03326 (3.87)   
TPRICETD D2/D1 -0.02957 (-2.22)   -0.01773 (-3.74)   
 Contractual conditions 
FREETOLL D2/D1 0.04649 (2.77)   -0.04344 (-4.77)   
DURATION D2/D1 0.02458 (2.39)   0.02738 (4.60)   
PERSDR D2/D1 0.08740 (5.28)   -0.02832 (-4.61)   
FPENALTY D2/D1 -0.10906 (-6.30)   0.00966 (1.83)   
TRSHARE D2/D1 0.08967 (5.07)   0.07316 (8.08)   
LAND D2/D1 -0.02395 (-1.66)   -0.02332 (-4.42) 
  N  55  N  32 
H5a Reject: NO Model: Multivariate linear regression 
      
NB: NPUBLIC=32, 9 PUBLIC took the pilot survey in which LAND was not included; and  
      
 
For example, the different signs with respect to GFC, FGROWTH, FREETOLL, PERSDR and 
FPENALTY suggest that these parameters significantly influence the two cohorts in very different 
ways. Respectively, the GFC factor and the condition of FREETOLL in contract will increase the risk 
aversion of PRIVATE, ceteris paribus. The GFC worsened the market’s ability to finance these mega 
infrastructure projects and we have demonstrated repeatedly that PPPs are perceived as a financing 
mechanism for governments to circumvent fiscal constraints.  
As explained in the preceding section, the private partner having the right to set toll pricing will create 
the public perception that PPP projects accrue benefits to private investors at the cost of motorists, 
which will have a detrimental impact on patronage. The private sector understands this ramification 
and therefore prefers not to exercise this entitlement. The signs of parameter estimates of GFC and 
FREETOLL for PUBLIC are negative, indicating that the presence of these conditions will reduce the 
risk aversion of public sector authorities. The reason for this result is unclear; this could be an area for 
future research.  
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The factor of FGROWTH increases the risk aversion of PUBLIC but decreases the risk aversion of 
PRIVATE, ceteris paribus. The growth factor implies the expansion of the PPP scheme, however, the 
result here signals that PUBLIC do not prefer to see a greater adoption of PPPs in delivering transport 
infrastructure. This is in contrast to the outcome in Table 7, where based on respondents’ real 
experience, PUBLIC viewed PPPs favourably in the presence of other alternatives. A possible 
explanation may be that the greater public scrutiny and higher transaction costs associated with PPPs 
make them less appealing to PUBLIC.  
These contrasting outcomes demonstrate that behavioural perceptions can be very different from 
reality. The growth factor has generated a positive impact for the PRIVATE (the negative sign 
associated with PRVRI means risk aversion is lessened), because it signals that greater opportunities 
will open up for private investment.  
FPENALTYD2 has a negative sign, indicating that the risk-averse PRIVATE prefer an outcome-based 
model that rewards their efforts based on agreed performance standards, with corresponding 
abatements for failing to adhere to these standards. 
The negative sign of PERSDRD1 for PUBLIC explains their strong desire to have in place clear 
performance measures to evaluate the outcome of service efforts by PRIVATE (the negative sign 
means embedded performance standards will lower the risk aversion of PUBLIC ceteris paribus).  
However, the condition of imposing financial penalties on under-performance increases the risk 
aversion of PUBLIC, ceteris paribus (FPENALTYD1 is positive). Some PUBLIC explained to the first 
author that they found this kind of model presented too much operational difficulty because it was not 
easy to prove that the private proponent had failed to meet the standards and most of their arguments 
did not get upheld in court. Their view is in line with the proposition of ICT and TCE that court-
ordering is not a solution to incomplete contracts due to the bounded rationality of the outside 
arbitrator.  
Respondents from both sectors are risk-averse to the idea of sharing toll revenue, as indicated by the 
positive TRSHARED2/D1. This is because they do not wish to be perceived as making a financial gain 
from commuters travelling on the facility, with the ramifications of reduced patronage and political 
backlash.  
The duration of the concession has a negative impact on respondents from both sectors (the positive 
DURATIOND2/D1 represent worsening risk aversion due to this condition, ceteris paribus). This 
suggests that it will take longer to recover the costs of investment and there is a higher chance of 
change in environment factors, hence producing higher uncertainty.  
The condition of LAND reduces the risk aversion of respondents of both sectors, ceteris paribus. Both 
PRIVATE and PUBLIC believed that government has the power and resources to acquire the 
necessary land for constructing the underlying facility. Future PPP concessions should consider 
allowing government to retain this risk, as it will translate into greater VFM by lowering the risk 
premium charged by the private proponents. This approach has been adopted in a recent project – the 
Peninsula Link in the State of Victoria in Australia.  
Interestingly, the negative TPRICETDD2/D1 hint that both sectors consider toll pricing can do more 
than just act as a means of finance, as it currently stands (the condition lessens their risk aversion 
ceteris paribus). This is a strong message for politicians, who should consider structural reforms to the 
PPP tollroad scheme in order to gain a greater benefit at the macroeconomic level. Market discipline 
can enhance the benefit of pricing mechanisms to help change people’s travelling habits (e.g., de 
Palma et al., 2007a; de Palma et al., 2007b), a benefit that is presently not being exploited to its fullest 
extent.  
Not only do these results lead us not to reject H5a, they also offer useful insights into ways of 
minimising uncertainty. Changes to contractual conditions (which can be negotiated) and prudent 
financial regulations by government (to avoid further disasters like the GFC) that will make the 
environment more welcome to private capital investments can help enhance VFM. 
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Among the key arguments of TCE is the power the institutional background has on the uncertainty 
effect, which channels through to the choice of governance mode, affecting contracting parties’ risk 
preference. Our sample data supports this proposition (Table 15), where the positive parameter 
associated with SOVD2 (0.00238) showing that greater sovereign risk causes higher risk aversion of 
PRIVATE leads us to not reject H5b. 
Reputational effect 
TCE maintains that economic actors who engage in repeated transactions value their reputation with 
their transacting parties. Media is a powerful source of influence on reputational risk. How supportive 
local media had been to PPPs in the past (captured by ‘prior experience’) would have an influential 
impact on the private proponents’ risk preferences.  
We cannot reject H6 based on the results in Table 15, where the positive MEDD2 (0.00184) suggests 
that a higher risk of negative media coverage increases the risk aversion of PRIVATE. Therefore, we 
confirm that media exposure can help contain opportunistic behaviour by private partners due to the 
consequent future economic consequences of negative reputational effects. 
Table 15:  Institutional and reputational effects  
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable Parameter t-value Adjusted R2 Hypothesis Reject 
 
Model 
               
PRVRI Constant 0.14399 (20.66) 0.35240   Multivariate 
Linear 
regression 
  SOVD2 0.00238 (13.87)  5b  NO  
 MEDD2 0.00184 (8.07)  6 NO 
  N   60         
        
Risk preferences versus risk-sharing 
The Chiles and McMackin model (1996) predicts that contractual conditions can change transactors’ 
risk preferences. We argue that in a risk-sharing partnership, the allocation of risks can affect 
contracting parties’ risk preferences.  
We have established in RQ1 that private sector agents are much more risk-averse compared with 
public sector authorities. This implies that governments and users of the facilities are being charged a 
high risk premium to compensate for the risks undertaken by private sector partners. But what if risks 
were allocated on a more equitable basis – would that reduce agents’ risk aversion?  
We test this proposition by simulating the data of risk allocations in the ‘prior experience’, where we 
allocate traffic risk and financial risk 50/50 between the two sectors, i.e., they are shared equally. 
Figure 31 shows that both risk indices have decreased after the simulation. The average PUBRI has 
dropped slightly (the average value is down by 28 per cent, from 7.26 per cent to 5.24 per cent) while 
the PRVRI has fallen dramatically (the average value is down by 38 per cent from 23.15 per cent to 
14.40 per cent).  
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Figure 31:  Risk index comparison – before versus after simulation 
The fall in the PRVRI is within expectations, which corresponds to the point we raised earlier, that the 
norm in the current risk-sharing regime is to shift all risks to the private sector. The fall in the PUBRI 
is also reasonable. Recall the discussion in Section 4 that most PUBLIC cared about project risks 
simply because they did not want the project to fail. Taking on the responsibility of sharing some of 
the traffic and financial risks will assure them higher certainty in terms of project success and budget 
certainty.    
Two t-tests in Equations (3) and (4) indicate that the risk indices after the simulation are significantly 
different to those prior to the simulation. Hence, we cannot reject H7 at the five per cent significant 
level, that risk preferences are significantly affected by contractual conditions; in this case, how risks 
are shared. 
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6. Conclusions, policy implications and future research 
Optimising risk-sharing among parties that are profoundly different in terms of interests, objectives 
and risk preferences is the rationale underlying the VFM rhetoric in the current PPP procurement 
policy. This study has brought together the literature in a number of disciplines to investigate the 
extent to which the risk-sharing rationale in PPPs can facilitate the realisation of VFM, and to search 
for mechanisms of risk-sharing optimisation.  
The evidence collected through the CAPI survey has affirmed that risk-sharing is a crucial element in 
deriving VFM. The conclusions drawn and recommendations made herein are backed up by evidence 
collected over 32 countries, strengthening the international credentials of the study. We believe that 
this study can make a significant contribution to the betterment of policy-making in the private 
provision of public infrastructure delivery. 
In spite of the VFM rhetoric, the survey data strongly suggested that PPPs were essentially considered 
to be a financing method rather than a procurement method of infrastructure-based service. The caveat 
is that too much emphasis is being placed on cost savings and budget certainty for the public sector 
agency without truly acknowledging the power of the pricing mechanism, which can help realise the 
full potential of an integrated, multi-modal transport network. A further implication of PPPs being 
primarily a financing instrument is that it is questionable whether they can deliver VFM in terms of 
social benefit. PPPs have tended to be selected for projects that are fairly unambiguous about the 
benefits to the private sector. Thus, investment priorities have been steered toward focusing on 
projects in corridors that the private sector can understand, and away from networks and systems that 
ultimately are areas where the overall economic welfare benefit should be identified. These projects in 
corridors are only a subset of the network, the strong focus on which may result in the rest of the 
network being either underpriced or neglected.  
In an effort to answer the questions posed, this research has affirmed a number of significant 
relationships that involve the risk preferences of contracting parties: choice of procurement method, 
contractual conditions, the institutional environment (which includes the legal system and the political 
system), the clarity of government’s strategic objectives, property rights, and the way in which risks 
are shared among contracting parties. We conclude that risk-sharing can be optimised through more 
equitable risk allocation, better handling of public misperception about the scheme and misperceived 
social risks associated with ownership transfer, undertaking reforms at the institutional level to make 
the environment more conducive to PPP investments, and selecting a reputable private partner for a 
sustainable partnership.  
Contributions to policy making  
This study not only quantifies risk preferences, but also provides an internally consistent framework in 
which the trade-off between risks can be identified, and the extent to which barriers that might prevent 
both parties in identifying areas where they may need to compromise can be gauged.  
Within this framework is the PPPRI – derived based on the direct experience of stakeholders in a large 
number of tollroad projects from 32 countries. The PPPRI has great potential. It captures stakeholder 
perceptions of risk toward any specific project.  
The effect of various attribute combinations in a risk-allocation package is achieved by varying the 
levels around the respondent-specific RP inputs; the resulting utility indicators will convey the effect 
in the form of various risk perceptions toward the project. Contracting parties then can weigh the 
trade-offs between different risk combinations and decide what risks they wish to take on and those 
they can transfer, taking into account the risk premium they would require.  
The PPPRI can therefore be incorporated into a contract assessment regime that provides a meaningful 
measure of how risk perceptions can be balanced. Hence, risk preferences can be managed by 
modifying the level of contractual conditions as well as policy and institutional variables. Our 
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hypothesis testing has demonstrated this potential. This contribution is significant, in that policy 
makers can now make adjustments to the contract and the procurement policy to influence contracting 
parties’ risk preferences to correspond to the level of risk premium that the procurer is willing to and 
able to afford.  
Future research 
We have uncovered potential avenues of risk-sharing optimisation through data simulation to create 
scenarios of risk allocation. This is only the beginning of an exciting research agenda; much greater 
discoveries could be unearthed by extending the process to other risk attributes, contractual as well as 
institutional conditions.  
Finally, while our focus is on risk-sharing during contract design, PPPs are long-term contracts, so 
there will be ongoing issues during the operation and maintenance period. Future research can 
investigate post-implementation risks and post-concession risks, which form part of an important line 
of research on incentive schemes.  
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Appendix A: Definitions of risk attributes 
 Downside risk of X% 
indicates that there is a X% probability that 
Risk neutral of Y% 
indicates that there is a Y% probability that 
Upside gain of Z% 
indicates that there is a Z% probability that 
Traffic risk the actual traffic volume will be below forecast the actual traffic volume will be meeting the 
forecast  
the traffic volume will be above the forecast 
Financial risk changes in economic conditions will adversely 
affect the financial returns the tollroad is expected 
to earn  
changes in economic conditions will make no 
difference to the financial returns the tollroad is 
expected to earn 
changes in economic conditions will increase 
the financial returns the tollroad is expected to 
earn 
Network risk future transport network developments by 
government may reduce traffic flows to the 
tollroad 
future transport network developments by 
government may have no major impact on traffic 
flows to the tollroad 
future transport network developments by 
government may increase traffic flows to the 
tollroad 
force majeure the occurrence of uninsured events may worsen 
the tollroad’s performance  
in the event that uninsured events occur, the other 
party will agree to a transparent approach to 
redress the aggrieved party 
all events are well insured, or if not both parties 
are willing to negotiate in good faith to redress 
the aggrieved party  
Sovereign risk future changes in government policies may 
worsen policy fragmentation across different 
levels of government 
future changes in government policies may not 
have an effect on the existing overall PPP policy 
framework 
future changes in government policies may 
result in a more consistent and coherent PPP 
policy framework across all political 
jurisdictions  
Risk of unclear 
project objectives 
project objectives are unspecified or are unclear 
to contracting parties and the community 
project objectives are clearly specified and there 
are clear communications amongst contracting 
parties and the community 
project objectives are made clear to the market 
and project deliveries will adhere to stated 
objectives throughout all project phases  
Political and 
reputation risk 
contracting parties will not deliver the project in 
the public interest, the public sector is seen as 
offloading public accountability, thus causing 
public resentment to the PPP scheme and the 
project 
political and reputational risk is not of significant 
concern 
all parties understand this risk and are willing to 
internalise this risk within its own sector as well 
as to collaborate with the other party to resolve 
public resentment 
Media risk the media is critical of the PPP scheme/project, 
thus exposing the tollroad to poor publicity  
the media is neutral to the PPP scheme/project, 
thus resulting in low publicity for the tollroad 
the media is supportive to the PPP 
scheme/project, it conveys to the community the 
public benefits of the tollroad, resulting in 
welcome publicity  
Risk of public 
perception 
public acceptance of private ownership of 
tollroad, public expectations of benefits derived 
from the tollroad, and of both sectors’ 
commitment to the community are poor 
public perceptions of private ownership of 
tollroad, public expectations of benefits derived 
from the tollroad, and of both sectors’ 
commitment to the community are of insignificant 
concern 
the public welcomes private ownership of 
tollroad and public expectations of benefits 
derived from the tollroad, and of both sectors’ 
commitment to the community are high 
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Appendix B:  List of survey respondents 
The table below lists, in alphabetical order, the people who generously offered us their valuable time 
in filling out the experiment survey and shared with us their invaluable expertise in the field of PPPs 
and tollroads. We wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge their generosity and kindness, as well 
as the people who wish to remain anonymous, without whom, this research would not have been 
possible. 
Comments expressed in this report do not represent the views or opinions of any individual who 
participated in the survey.   
 
LAST NAME OTHER NAMES ORGANISATION 
Adam Wendy PB, AUSTRALIA 
Akers Gillian Strategic design + Development 
Allen Bob Sydney Harbour Tunnel Company Ltd 
Alli Nazir South African National Roads Agency Ltd 
Arndt Raphael Future Fund 
Arriaga Javier Lopez Acciona, SPAIN 
Ashley David SKM, AUSTRALIA 
Aubert Julian Scott Wilson, UK 
Balfe Peter Balfe & Assoc 
Bleach Murray Intoll 
Brock Tom GHD Pty Ltd, AUSTRALIA  
Brown Stephen Access Capital Advisers 
Burns Brett  
Camarsh Chris CP2, USA 
Canavan Tony Department of Treasury and Finance, VIC 
Cantan Linda Plenary Group 
Carew Mark Transfield Services 
Carr John PwC, UK 
Cavanagh Gerard Arup 
Chilov Robert Macquarie Group 
Clark Sarah Partnerships British Columbia, CANADA  
Cleary Flan RiverCity Motorway 
Cleary Michael ANZ 
Coertjens Ton Rijkswaterstaat, NETHERLANDS 
Daley Ken Transurban, USA  
Dawson Ken Crosscity Motorway 
de Vera Fernando Gutiárrez  
DEAU Thierry Meridiam Infrastructure 
D'Elia Mario PwC, AUSTRALIA 
Dent Des 10,000 Friends of Greater Sydney 
Devoil Neal John Laing, UK 
Dobinson Ken Dobinson & Associates Pty Ltd 
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Dunn Matthew NSW Treasury 
Easson Michael EG Funds Management 
Foster Paul AMP Capital Investors 
Gardiner John  
Gavilanes Gerardo Ministry of Fomento, Spain 
Godley Robert Halcrow, UK 
Goldsmith Paul RTA, NSW 
González J. Dionisio CRTM (Madrid Region PTA), SPAIN 
Gordon Cameron University of Canberra 
Heavener Norman Westpac Banking Corporation 
Hombergen Leon Rijkswaterstaat, NETHERLANDS  
Humffray Howard John Holland Group, AUSTRALIA 
Jellie David  
Johnston Neal Ernst & Young, AUSTRALIA 
Kessler Peter John Holland Group, AUSTRALIA 
Lackey Sam RTA NSW 
Larocca David Ernst & Young, AUSTRALIA 
Laughton Graeme GRL Consulting Services 
Lay Max Connect East 
Lee Joung American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials, USA 
Locke M. S. PwC, AUSTRALIA 
Lord Thomas Abigroup 
Mathers Ken Linking Melbourne Authority, VIC 
McKerral John  
Milcz Chris CBA 
Misko Marko Clayton Utz 
Morris Rob  
Mounsey Graham AECOM 
Munro Ian Queensland Treasury, QLD 
Murray Peter Ernst & Young, AUSTRALIA 
Murray Steve Clayton Utz 
O'Shea Paul Transurban (till 2008) 
Papantoniou Peter City North Infrastructure Pty Ltd, QLD 
Paradis Charles Bouygues Construction, FRANCE 
Perez-Diaz Marcos Egis Projects, FRANCE 
Plant Tom Macquarie Capital 
Priddis John CBA 
Read Graham Blake Dawson, AUSTRALIA 
Reynolds Ken Baulderstone, AUSTRALIA 
Rubio Nicolas Cintra, USA 
Sandrejko Ed CrossCity Tunnel 
Scarcella Vincent Department of Transport and Main Roads, QLD 
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Scott William QIC, AUSTRALIA 
Smith Alf Department of Industry, Innovation and Regional 
Development, VIC 
Soliño Antonio Sánchez Universidad PolitÃ©cnica de Madrid, SPAIN 
Sonego Massimo Atlantia, ITALY 
Stevens Craig Dept of Infrastructure & Planning, QLD 
Theau Ludovic Hastings Funds Management, FRANCE 
Tiong Robert NTU, SINGAPORE 
Vann Brad Clayton Utz 
Vassallo Jose Manuel Universidad PolitÃ©cnica de Madrid, SPAIN 
Ware Julian TfL, UK 
Warren David Corrs Chambers Westgarth, AUSTRALIA 
Warwick Richard GHD Pty Ltd, AUSTRALIA 
Webb Matthew RTA NSW 
Wilson Bruce Bilfinger Berger Services, AUSTRALIA 
Wilson Chris Halcrow, AUSTRALIA 
Wilson Ray BrisConnections 
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